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Abstract
The research described in this work can significantly simplify and facil-
itate the creation and configuration of secure access control rule sets.
Access control is used to provide confidential data or information only
to authorized entities and deny access otherwise. Access control mech-
anisms can be configured with access control rule sets that need to be
created and maintained by the users or administrators.
The research commences by answering the first research question:
1. How can access control be integrated into future products?
Basic concepts are presented and integrated into a holistic design. The
latter is embedded into a general framework, which was developed by
an academia-industry consortium, and in which the author participated.
Questions arise regarding usability aspects of access control mecha-
nisms. An analysis of security services in the beginning of this dis-
sertation shows that, especially for access control mechanisms that are
managed by casual users, a high level of usability is required because
individual preferences of the data owner have to be taken into account.
Analysis of how the core security objectives (see Section 2.2) can be
achieved identifies a usability gap regarding the generation and con-
figuration of access control rule sets. Automation is not fully possible
because individual preferences of users need to be considered.
Related research questions are:
2. What are the requirements for usable access control rule sets?
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3. What are formally founded quantifiable measurements for those
requirements, and how can these measurements be used to sup-
port users in generating of usable access control rule sets?
To answer these questions, a systematic analysis of expert opinions and
related work was performed. The results of that analysis were grouped
into categories and further refined into six informal requirements. The
six informal requirements were mathematically formalized and six as-
sociated sets with respective linear metrics were derived. These formal
tools are used to automatically calculate additional information about
the actual access control rule set to support users in generating and op-
timizing the rule set properly. Two user studies were carried out to val-
idate and evaluate the research and the findings presented in this work.
They demonstrate that our metrics help users generate statistically sig-
nificant better rule sets.
The dissertation concludes with an outlook and a vision for further re-
search in usable access control rule set configuration.
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VZusammenfassung
Die in dieser Dissertation dargestellte Forschung erleichtert wesentlich
die Erstellung und Konfiguration von sicheren Zugriffskontrollregeln.
Zugriffskontrolle wird benötigt um sicherzustellen, dass nur autorisier-
te Entitäten auf vertrauliche Daten oder Informationen zugreifen kön-
nen. Zugriffskontrollmechanismen können mit Hilfe von Zugriffskon-
trollregelsätzen konfiguriert werden, welche von Administratoren oder
Benutzern erstellt und gewartet werden müssen.
Diese Forschungsarbeit beginnt mit dem Beantworten der einleitenden
Forschungsfrage:
1. Wie kann Zugriffskontrolle in zukünftige Produkte integriert wer-
den?
Hierfür werden grundlegende Konzepte vorgestellt und in ein ganzheit-
liches Design integriert. Im Anschluss sind diese Konzepte in ein Pro-
grammiergerüst integriert worden, welches von einem Team aus akade-
mischen und industriellen Partnern erstellt wurde, zu welchem auch der
Autor gehörte.
Fragestellungen bezüglich der Benutzbarkeit von Zugriffskontrollme-
chanismen werden erörtert. Eine Analyse von Sicherheitsdiensten zu
Beginn dieser Dissertation zeigt, dass insbesondere Zugriffskontrollme-
chanismen, welche von nicht professionellen Nutzern betreut werden,
ein hohes Maß an Benutzbarkeit benötigen, da individuelle Präferenzen
der Datenbesitzer berücksichtigt werden müssen.
Analysen, welche sich damit befassen, wie grundlegende Sicherheits-
ziele erreicht werden können, zeigen, dass die Erstellung und Konfi-
guration von Zugriffskontrollregelsätzen schwierig sein kann, da eine
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vollständige Automatisierung hier nicht möglich ist, da die individuel-
len Präferenzen der Benutzer berücksichtigt werden müssen.
Die zugehörigen Forschungsfragen lauten:
2. Was sind die Anforderungen an benutzbare Zugriffskontrollregel-
sätze?
3. Was sind formal fundierte und quantifizierbare Messwerte für
solche Anforderungen, und wie können diese Messwerte Be-
nutzern helfen, benutzbare Zugriffskontrollregelsätze zu gener-
ieren?
Um diese Fragen zu beantworten wurde eine systematische Analyse so-
wohl von Expertenmeinungen als auch von verwandten Arbeiten durch-
geführt. Die Resultate dieser Analyse wurden kategorisiert und zu sechs
informellen Anforderungen für sichere und benutzbare Zugriffskon-
trollregelsätze weiterentwickelt. Diese sechs informellen Anforderun-
gen werden mathematisch formalisiert und zu sechs linearen Metriken
konsolidiert. Diese formellen Werkzeuge werden genutzt, um automa-
tisiert Zusatzinformationen zu berechnen, welche Benutzer darin unter-
stützen können, Regelsätze zu erstellen und zu konfigurieren. Zwei Be-
nutzerstudien wurden zur Validierung und Evaluierung der Forschung
und der Resultate dieser Arbeit durchgeführt. Sie zeigen, dass die hier
vorgestellten formellen Werkzeuge Benutzer darin unterstützen, signi-
fikant bessere Regelsätze zu generieren.
Diese Dissertation schließt mit einem Ausblick und einer Vision für
zukünftige Forschung im Bereich der benutzbaren Zugriffskontrollre-
gelsatzkonfiguration.
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1. Introduction
One of the fundamental challenges of information technology (IT) is to
reflect users’ usability expectations in security mechanisms. The best
security mechanisms are of no avail if they are too complex for the
users to use correctly. Therefore, the design of mechanisms, tools, and
interfaces that combine a high level of security and usability [Beckerle,
2009b, Cranor and Garfinkel, 2005] is one of the main challenges of IT-
security. If security is not usable, then this may cause security breaches
that possibly lead to high costs for the industry and may cause privacy
loss for casual users [Symantec, 2011].
Too many IT-security solutions tend to overstrain non-expert users. In
home and enterprise environments, users want to share private or confi-
dential information but often do not define appropriate rules for access
control, such as file sharing access rights. However, the imposition of
such security features often leads to insecure or impractical measures,
such as access control rules that are too general. In addition, users tend
to deactivate security mechanisms or render them useless by granting
access to everyone. This kind of behavior is very common nowadays,
and has been investigated in the context of browser cookies, virus scan-
ners, and file access controls [Herzog and Shahmehri, 2007].
Access control mechanisms are used to ensure that access to resources is
granted only to authorized parties, and to ensure that authorized parties
are not denied access to resources that they should have access to. Ac-
cess control for digital resources such as data files has a lot in common
with access control for physical locations. Access control decisions
are taken according to access control policies, which can intuitively be
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viewed as collections of high-level statements [Samarati and di Vimer-
cati, 2000] that are commonly expressed as access control rules. An
access control rule can be defined as a Boolean decision (ALLOW or
DENY) which is taken upon the arrival of an access request. A collec-
tion of such rules is called an access control rule set.
The authoring of access control policies and their management and im-
plementation is not restricted to specialists in computer security. Ac-
cess control policy creation and administration are expected even from
novice users [Egelman et al., 2011]. Social networks, for instance, re-
quire users to manage access control rules for granting access to their
private messages and photos, regardless of their expertise in security.
Another application that requires users to create and manage access
control rules is home data sharing [Mazurek et al., 2010]. However,
the task of generating and managing access control rule sets is not triv-
ial [Bauer et al., 2009, Egelman et al., 2011, Smetters and Good, 2009].
Errors in access control rule sets can lead to unintended results, such
as sharing more (or less) data than desired, and the generation of too
complex access control rule sets [Smetters and Good, 2009]. Complex
access control rule sets are difficult to manage and tend to have more
errors.
It is indispensable to research new possibilities to support users in gen-
erating proper access control rule sets. Therefore the term “usable ac-
cess control rule sets” is introduced, denoting access control rule sets
that
• (i) reflect access control policies correctly and
• (ii) are easy to manage and understand according to expert opin-
ions
As one step to achieve usable access control rule sets, this disserta-
tion presents a novel approach that supports generation of sound and
manageable access control rule sets. That is achieved by defining a set
of goals for building usable access control rule sets. Those goals are
then formalized. The formalization makes it possible to compare, an-
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alyze and optimize access control rule sets manually or automatically
and therefore provides the needed help to experts and casual system
administrators.
1.1. Motivation
Usable security and usable access control in particular is important and
is going to be even more important in the future. This claim can be
verified by looking at the concept of privacy and challenges being raised
by future smart products.
For example, in 1967, Alan Westin defined privacy as “the claim of
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when,
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to
others” [Westin, 1967]. The right to privacy has been firmly established
in many cultures through laws for many years, but needs to be period-
ically adjusted to reflect new developments. For example, in January
2012 the European Commission proposed a comprehensive reform of
the EU’s 1995 data protection rules (Directive 95/46/EC) to regulate the
processing of personal data and strengthen online privacy rights [Euro-
pean Commission, 2012].
As seen in the definition by Westin, people and societies have different
expectations and understandings about privacy. Identity Management
[Martucci et al., 2011], Privacy preserving identifiers [Martucci, 2009]
and anonymous communication [Syverson et al., 1997, Reiter and Ru-
bin, 1997, Martucci et al., 2006] represent some of the ways to preserve
privacy by focusing on decoupling the information from the user. An
additional approach is to control the information flow by only sending
information to authorized entities.
Smart products are a class of upcoming devices that are currently be-
ing developed to bridge the gap between the real and the virtual world.
They provide a natural and purposeful product-to-human interaction
and context-aware adaptivity. An example for a smart product is the
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Cocktail Companion that guides the user in choosing and mixing cock-
tails (see Section 3.4.1 and [Kasten et al., 2012])
To fulfill their tasks, smart products need knowledge about the appli-
cation, the environment that they are immersed in, and confidential
user data, such as the user’s preferences and behavioral information.
Moreover, smart products often need to exchange private / confiden-
tial information among themselves to complete collaborative tasks that
require data from multiple sources, such as booking flight tickets or ho-
tel rooms. Smart products can exist in highly dynamic environments.
However, the amount of possible security and privacy breaches is pro-
portional to the sheer number and variety of smart products. Equally,
the variety of devices with different user interfaces also increases the
complexity of administrative tasks for the end users.
The administration of security features in computational systems by
non-expert users will become even more challenging in the future, be-
cause smart products for instance, add more complexity to such scenar-
ios by increasing the administrative burden on the end-users. Therefore,
one of the main challenges regarding smart products is the design of
mechanisms that combine a customizable level of usable security.
In any regard, it is important to enable people to enforce their right to
individual informational self-determination and to design and develop
the necessary tools and mechanisms to support them.
Access Control
One class of such tools is access control mechanisms. Access control
mechanisms, if correctly used, can help preserve users privacy and con-
fidentiality. Usability is a key aspect there. Only if the relevant tools
are easily usable they can effectively support users in enforcing their
expectations about security and privacy.
The goal of this dissertation is to help users generate usable access con-
trol rule sets that reflect their expectations and allow them to control
their confidential data and to allow users to preserve their privacy.
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1.2. Research Questions
Three research questions are identified and answered in this thesis:
1. How can usable access control be integrated into future products?
2. What are the requirements for usable access control rule sets?
3. What are formally founded quantifiable measurements for those
requirements and how can these measurements be used to support
users in generating usable access control rule sets?
Research question (1.) is answered in Chapter 3 (and partly in Sec-
tion 2.3), research question (2.) is answered in Chapter 4, and research
question (3.) is answered in Chapter 5.
1.3. Scientific Contributions
The scientific contributions are directly related to the research questions
presented in the previous Section 1.2.
They are:
1. An analysis, goals, concepts, and a design towards usable access
control in smart products
2. Six requirements for usable access control rule sets
3. Sets and quantitative metrics of the six requirements for usable
access control rule sets
Each scientific contribution can be found in the same chapter as its re-
spective research question: (1.) in Chapter 3 (and partly in Section 2.3),
(2.) in Chapter 4, and (3.) in Chapter 5.
1.4. Research Method
The research method is based on nine steps in three blocks as seen in
Table 1.1.
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Table 1.1.: Methodology
Block 1
1.a Analysis of how core security objectives can be achieved
1.b Integration of access control into smart products
1.c Proof of concept and functional tests
Block 2
2.a Usable access control requirements engineering
2.b A pilot study
2.c Refinement of requirements
Block 3
3.a Formalization of requirements
3.b Deduction of linear metrics from requirements
3.c Evaluation with users and experts
In the first part we analyze solutions for usable security and show how
they can be integrated into smart products. Ideas, concepts as well as a
design are presented.
The second part consists of a pilot study with system administrators
(using semi-structured interviews) and an analysis of papers mainly pre-
sented at the scientific conferences CHI and SOUPS. That leads to the
informal definition of six goals for building usable and secure access
control rule sets.
In the third part we formalize these goals and assign a set (that contains
elements that influence the usability of the rule set negatively regarding
the goal) and a metric to each. The introduced metrics allow the assign-
ment of a weighted score to each goal. Assigning scores to rule sets
allows users to evaluate them, identify weaknesses and compare alter-
natives, allowing for automation of the optimization process in future
work. We evaluated the helpfulness of these metrics to users in creat-
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ing usable access control rule sets, and how our metrics correlate to the
opinion of IT support professionals.
1.5. Thesis Structure
In this dissertation, Chapter 2 presents the background and the related
work on usable access control. We analyze how core security objectives
can be achieved in the context of smart products as an example. There-
fore, the usability aspects of current security tools are analyzed. This
analysis shows that security mechanisms can often be made transpar-
ent to the user by automating them. Exceptions exist for access control
mechanisms in the context of usable access control rule set configura-
tion.
In Chapter 3 it is shown how access control can be integrated into future
products by showing an example of this process for smart products.
Ideas, concepts, and a design are presented.
In Chapter 4 informal requirements for usable access control rule sets
are defined. After an analysis of the related work and a pilot study that
was carried out with experts, six requirements for usable access control
rule sets are refined.
By formally defining these six requirements and the related sets and
metrics in Chapter 5, it is possible to analyze and compare different
rule sets concerning their security and usability.
In Chapter 6 the formalization is evaluated. It is shown that the sets and
the related metrics help system administrators and casual users to gen-
erate more usable access control rule sets, and that the metrics directly
reflect the opinion of experts.
In Section 7 an outlook is given and the future vision of Interactive Rule
Learning is presented. The dissertation is completed with final remarks
and conclusions in Section 7.5.
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2. Background
In this chapter we present the background of our research into usable
access control. It starts with some general explanations about pervasive
computing in Section 2.1 where smart products are introduced as an
example domain for the following Sections. That section is followed
by security objectives of IT-security in Section 2.2 and how they can
be achieved in the context of the smart products domain in Section 2.3.
In Section 2.4, a detailed look into access control mechanisms is given,
whereas Section 2.5 explains what rule learning is. The background
chapter concludes with an analysis of the state of the art in usable access
control and a summary.
2.1. Pervasive Computing
Pervasive computing is a reality today. The vision of Mark Weiser
[Weiser, 1991] has become true. Computers are all around us, and
mostly invisible. They can be found in cars, nearly every electronic
device, and start to be integrated in a lot of non-electronic objects like
clothes. It opens up a lot of new possibilities. At the same time these
devices gather data and are often connected among themselves and with
the internet. It is indispensable to control their flow of information with
proper access control mechanisms and fitting access control rule sets.
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2.1.1. Smart Products
Smart products are a new class of devices that are currently being de-
veloped to bridge the gap between the real and the virtual world. They
provide a natural and purposeful product-to-human interaction (usabil-
ity) and context-aware adaptivity (knowledge about the environment
that influences their behavior). To fulfill their tasks, smart products
need knowledge about the application, the environment that they are
immersed in, and confidential user data, such as the user’s preferences
and behavioral information.
Examples for smart products can be found in Kasten et al. [2012] and
a smart product named the Cooking Companion is described in Section
3.4.1 and a video about it can be found online1.
The official SmartProducts website [SmartProducts] describes smart
products with the following words: “Smart products help customers,
designers and workers to deal with the ever increasing complexity and
variety of modern products. Smart products leverage ‘proactive knowl-
edge’ to communicate and co-operate with humans, other products and
the environment.”
Proactive Knowledge
Proactive knowledge is described with the following definition: “Proac-
tive knowledge encompasses knowledge about the product itself (fea-
tures, functions, dependencies, usage, etc.), its environment (physical
context, other smart products) and its users (preferences, abilities, in-
tentions, etc.). In addition, proactive knowledge comprises executable
workflows and knowledge about interaction, enabling the smart product
to proactively engage in multimodal dialogues with the user. Thereby,
smart products ‘talk’, ‘guide’, and ‘assist’ designers, workers and con-
1SmartProducts Demonstrator: CocktailCompanion
http://www.smartproducts-project.eu/index.php/videos
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LNXUxGPfxqU
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sumers dealing with them. Some proactive knowledge will be co-
constructed with the product, while other parts are gathered during the
product lifecycle using embedded sensing and communication capabil-
ities. The outcome of SmartProducts will impact the manufacturing
and consumer domain, primarily targeting consumer goods, automotive
and aerospace industries, spanning both product innovation (for con-
sumer goods and automotive) and process innovations (for automotive
and aerospace)” [SmartProducts] (see Figure 2.1.1).
Figure 2.1.1.: SmartProducts Overview [SmartProducts]
Moreover, smart products often need to exchange private / confidential
information among themselves to complete collaborative tasks that re-
quire data from multiple sources, such as providing users with guidance
on cooking food. Smart products can be a part of highly dynamic en-
vironments. A general introduction to smart products can be found in
[Mühlhäuser, 2008].
More information about the SmartProducts high level architecture can
be found in [Schreiber et al., 2011].
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2.1.2. Security for Pervasive Computing
The amount of possible security breaches is proportional to the number
and variety of smart products. Correspondingly, the variety of devices
with different user interfaces also increases the complexity of adminis-
trative tasks for the end users. Therefore, one of the main challenges of
IT-security regarding smart products is the design of mechanisms that
combine a high level of security and usability [Beckerle et al., 2010,
Beckerle, 2009b, Cranor and Garfinkel, 2005].
Usability is even more important when implementing security in highly
connected devices that exchange private information and are maintained
by casual users, compared to traditional security systems that are man-
aged by experts.
More details about usable security in SmartProducts as an example for
pervasive computing can be found in Section 2.3 and Chapter 3.
2.2. Core Security Objectives
In this Section, we introduce some key security objectives that are go-
ing to be used throughout this dissertation: confidentiality, integrity, au-
thenticity and authorization. The definitions are based on the definitions
found in [Eckert, 2009].
2.2.1. Confidentiality
Confidentiality means that the assets of a computing system are acces-
sible only by authorized parties. Confidentiality is usually implemented
using cryptographic algorithms.
There are symmetric encryption mechanisms, such as AES [Daemen
and Rijmen, 1999], and asymmetric ones like RSA [Rivest et al., 1978].
Encryption demands the distribution of cryptographic keys among par-
ticipating devices. Asymmetric key encryption performs slower than
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symmetric key encryption but has the advantage of having separate
keys for encryption and decryption, allowing one key to be public while
maintaining security. Hence, large amounts of data are rarely encrypted
using asymmetric keys, instead only select data is, such as keys for sym-
metric encryption.
2.2.2. Integrity
Integrity means that assets can be modified only by authorized parties
or only in authorized ways. Integrity is mostly implemented using one-
way functions in combination with cryptographic algorithms.
Integrity has to ensure that any unauthorized change of data is recog-
nized. Data integrity is usually accomplished using one-way hash func-
tions and public key encryption, or just with symmetric keys. Mes-
sage Authentication Codes (MAC) [Krawczyk et al., 1997] are imple-
mented using symmetric keys and digital signatures with public-private
key pairs [Rivest et al., 1978].
2.2.3. Authenticity
Authentication is required to obtain a proof of correctness over an iden-
tity claim. Authenticity means that an entity can prove who or what
they claim to be. Authentication services are usually implemented by
proof of knowledge, proof of ownership, or proof of biometric trait.
2.2.4. Authorization
Authorization means that policies are used and enforced to specify ac-
cess rights. One way to implement authorization is through access rules,
collections of which are called rule sets, that are used by access control
mechanisms to determine if an entity is allowed to access information
or not.
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2.3. Achieving Security Objectives for
Smart Products
In this section we analyze how the core security objectives (see Sec-
tion 2.2) can be achieved. Such an analysis shows that there already
are possible solutions that can be applied for confidentiality, integrity,
and partly for authentication services to mostly automate them and thus
make them transparent to the user. In such a context, we show how and
why confidentiality, integrity and authenticity can be automated quite
well, but authorization cannot because of individual user preferences
that have to be taken into account. Smart products are used as a show-
case.
The analysis regarding confidentiality is presented in Section 2.3.1,
regarding integrity in Section 2.3.2, regarding authenticity in Section
2.3.3, and regarding authorization in Section 2.3.4. In each section, we
analyze the usability aspects of related security solutions. This initial
analysis is used to identify usability gaps in basic security mechanisms.
2.3.1. Approach for Confidentiality
Symmetric cipher algorithms are fast and widely used to assure confi-
dentiality. For a symmetric cipher algorithm, a pre-shared secret is re-
quired. All participants of a communication need this pre-shared secret
(key) to decrypt and encrypt the data. In smart products, the process of
symmetric key distribution is a potential challenge because, if a unique
key is required for every pair of communicating entities, the amount
of keys required is
(n
2
)
, where n is the total number of communicating
devices.
Fortunately, the required en- and decryption keys can be exchanged with
public key cryptography like RSA [Rivest et al., 1978], which is an
asymmetric cipher algorithm. It is feasible to embed public-private key
pairs into smart products, which would reduce total number of keys to
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2n. Such an approach is sufficient in principle and implements confi-
dentiality into highly dynamic environments using existing and standard
cryptographic systems.
The encryption itself is performed automatically and should not have a
significant negative impact on usability.
2.3.2. Approach for Integrity
Since cryptographic tools like RSA are expected to be embedded into
smart products (as seen in Section 2.3.1), there are going to be cryp-
tographic tools available for securing data integrity. The process of
proving data integrity can be fully automated and does not need user
interaction.
2.3.3. Approach for Authenticity
In smart product scenarios there are three basic types of authentication:
device-to-device, device-to-user, and user-to-user. There are sufficient
mechanisms based on digital certificates that can carry out device-to-
device authentication automatically. Device-to-user and user-to-user
authentication can be implemented using proofs of knowledge, biomet-
ric traits or digital tokens together with public-key encryption. In such
a case, once users have authenticated themselves one time to a smart
product, the device might be used to automate future authentication pro-
cedures between users and other devices.
2.3.4. Approach for Authorization
Smart products are delivered with predefined default rule sets. Such
approaches, however, disregard adaptivity to the end-user. The general
problem results from the diversity of user preferences, so more infor-
mation regarding the users is required. Authorization problems regard-
ing adaptivity and the user in smart products are discussed in Section
Matthias Beckerle Dissertation Usable Access Control
40 2. Background
2.4, where the existing access control models are outlined and evalu-
ated with regard to their suitability for smart product scenarios.
2.3.5. Conclusion and Analysis
For the protection goals confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and
authorization, a variety of working mechanisms exist that are suitable
for our smart products example. The correct configuration of these
mechanisms is, especially with regard to casual users acting as admin-
istrators, an open challenge. The protection goals Confidentiality, In-
tegrity, and Authentication can be and are already achieved with a min-
imal number of user interactions by using cryptographic methods and
biometric authentication. For authorization, the task of configuring ac-
cess control mechanisms involves a significant amount of often difficult
user interactions for defining proper access rules. Therefore, this disser-
tation focuses in Chapter 4, 5, and 6 on the configuration task of access
control rule sets.
The next Section will analyze different access control models regarding
their suitability to smart product scenarios
2.4. Access Control Models
The role of AC mechanisms, which are implemented in accordance to
AC models, is to ensure that only authorized entities are able to access
the information and functions of a computer system (principle of autho-
rization) [Stajano, 2002].
This section provides an overview of different access control models
and an evaluation of such models regarding their suitability to smart
product scenarios. In this section, we describe the following access
control (AC) models: Blacklists, Mandatory AC (MAC), Discretionary
AC (DAC), Role-Based AC (RBAC), and Attribute-Based AC (ABAC).
This section concludes with a set of recommendations for an AC model
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suitable for smart product scenarios. It concludes that ABAC models
together with Blacklists is the most suitable solution for such scenarios.
2.4.1. Blacklists
A Blacklist is a very simple AC model that blocks all requests from
entities that are included in a list. It is used to thwart known or recur-
rent attackers. An examples for blacklists are anti-spam filters for email
accounts where mails from known spam providers are automatically
blocked. Blacklists have to be configured manually, although some-
times they can be updated automatically according to predefined rules,
e.g., multiple unauthorized requests, or a series of failed authentication
procedures. Blacklists are usually faster than other AC mechanisms
because their complexity class is lower, its performance can be O(1)
with a very small constant factor for the blacklist lookup. Blacklists
are rather simple to implement and use but also rather inflexible, as no
conditional access policies can be defined.
2.4.2. MAC/DAC
MAC and DAC are two early AC models [Brand, 1985]. They can be
seen as complementary approaches.
In MAC, a central administrator controls the access rights of each entity
of the system. No other entity is able to change the access rights. In such
a context, Multi Level Security (MLS) (such as Bell-La Padula [Bell and
Padula, 1976]) is a commonly used approach. In MLS, each entity or
object of the system has a security level assigned by a central authority.
Each entity is only able to access other entities or objects that have the
same or lower security level. Mandatory Integrity Control (MIC) is a
similar approach and is used in Microsoft Windows Vista (and later).
Processes can only write or delete other objects with a security level
lower or equal to their own.
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DAC differs from these approaches in that each owner of a file can grant
access rights to other entities. That way, users are able to share objects
among each other [Sandhu and Samarati, 1994]. DAC is used for exam-
ple in UNIX for sharing data and resources, where the owner of a file is
able to set the corresponding access rules.
2.4.3. RBAC
RBAC [Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 1992] introduced a new approach by as-
signing roles between the entity and its related rights. Access rights
are therefore assigned to roles rather than users. Each entity can have
several roles and each role can be held by multiple entities. For ad-
ministrative purposes, roles are established first, and afterward they are
assigned to entities. Since roles rarely change, this significantly reduces
the complexity for administering RBAC after the initial setup. Roles
can change dynamically, thus the user might gain and lose roles auto-
matically when doing particular tasks.
2.4.4. ABAC
One of the newest models is ABAC [Yuan and Tong, 2005b]. ABAC
uses attributes instead of roles to link rights to entities. For accessing a
resource, entities have to verify that they have the according attributes
needed for accessing the resource as demanded by the access policy.
Examples for attributes are the name of an entity, the age or the nation-
ality.
This procedure allows the use of dynamic conditions encoded in at-
tributes, such as the location of an entity, to decide whether to grant
access or not. Since the role as well as the security level of an entity
can be seen as attributes, it is possible to integrate concepts known from
other AC models like MAC, DAC or RBAC [Jin et al., 2012].
The formal definition of ABAC as used in this dissertation is given in
Chapter 5.
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2.4.5. Hybrid Approaches
In reality, the distinction between different AC models is not as strict as
shown in this section. There are hybrid models like the Location-Aware
Role-Based Access Control (LRBAC) [Ray et al., 2006], which allows
the use of a geographical location as a “role”. It is often possible to
derive a less complex AC model from a more complex one, e.g., it is
possible to create a MAC, DAC or RBAC mechanism from an ABAC
model.
Other approaches extend access control mechanisms or models with
additional functionality like RBAC with trust, that integrates trust and
RBAC for cloud data storage [Zhou et al., 2014] or access control mod-
els with break-glass [Brucker and Petritsch, 2009].
2.4.6. Access Control Model Conclusion
The access control model considered in this work is the attribute-based
access control (ABAC) model [Yuan and Tong, 2005a]. In contrast to
role-based access control (RBAC) [Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 1992] which
uses roles to associate access rights to users, ABAC uses attributes.
ABAC is more flexible than RBAC since dynamic conditions can be
encoded in attributes. Moreover, ABAC can be used to implement
other mechanisms, such as RBAC. Therefore, a formalization based on
ABAC also covers many other access control mechanisms.
2.5. Rule Learning
Rule learning is a sub-field within machine learning. It generates rules
that reflect a set of observations or instances. Since the optimization of
AC rules is the focus of this dissertation, it seems worthwhile to look
into rule learning, which is especially useful for automating the process
of future access control rule set optimizations and can be used as an
mechanism for intrusion detection systems (see Section 3.1.1).
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2.5.1. Machine Learning
There are many definitions for Machine Learning with a considerable
degree of variety:
• Definition 1: “Learning denotes changes in the system that are
adaptive in the sense that they enable the system to do the same
task or tasks drawn from the same population more efficiently and
more effectively the next time.” [Simon, 1983]
• Definition 2: “The study and computer modeling of learning pro-
cesses in their multiple manifestations constitutes the subject mat-
ter of machine learning.” [Carbonell et al., 1983]
• Definition 3: “Learning is constructing or modifying representa-
tions of what is being experienced.” [Michalski, 1986]
• Definition 4: “A computer program is said to learn from expe-
rience E with respect to some class of tasks T and performance
measure P, if its performance at tasks in T, as measured by P, im-
proves with experience.” [Mitchell, 1997]
While the first definition of machine learning reduces it to improvement
in the performance of a specific task or tasks, the second definition deals
only with the description and modeling of machine learning. Definition
3 again describes only the learning per se, without going into machine
learning. The fourth and final definition from T.M. Mitchell provides
the definition that is used in this dissertation. It is measurable and con-
tains both the aspect of learning as well as the aspect of problem solving.
The following description, which the fourth definition flows into, is used
in this dissertation:
Machine learning is dealing with computer programs that can learn by
experience. Just as the science of biology has different approaches to
describe learning, such as behaviorism or cognitivism [Bimmel et al.,
2000], there are also different approaches in machine learning, to un-
derstand learning and to implement it.
Usable Access Control Dissertation Matthias Beckerle
2.5. Rule Learning 45
A distinction is made between unsupervised learning and supervised
learning.
“Supervised” means here that there is already a set of observations and
for each observation in this set the result is known. For example, a
number of a person’s previous purchases was observed and now it shall
be predicted whether that person will spend, for a particular purchase,
more or less than C 50. Because of previous observations a theory
may be set up that makes it possible to predict the current purchase.
Example: It’s Saturday, and on those days the person has always spent
more than C 50, therefore it is predicted that the person is going to
spend more than C 50 today.
“Unsupervised learning” means that earlier observations are not as-
signed to a result. You may not know, for example, what the names
of different fruit lying on a table are. However, due to the characteris-
tics of the fruit, you can still sort them by their attributes like shape and
color. This approach illustrates the method of unsupervised clustering
[Hinton and Sejnowski, 1999].
Over the years a range of algorithms has been developed that imitate na-
ture or have more technical approaches as a starting point. Some, such
as multilayer perceptrons [Riedmiller, 1994] or Boltzmann Perceptron
Networks [Yair and Gersho, 1990], try to reproduce the functionality
of a brain at the level of neurons. Other approaches, such as support
vector machines [Schoelkopf et al., 1999] have an abstract mathemati-
cal approach as a starting point. The algorithms differ significantly not
only in the approach taken, but also in the applications, working speed,
accuracy and more [Jin, 2005, Haykin, 2008].
2.5.2. Rule Learner
A rule learner is a learning algorithm that is able to generate rules out
of a set of examples (instances) [Fürnkranz, 1999].
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Rule-Learners pursue a very intuitive approach, compared to the algo-
rithms mentioned in the previous section. Rule Learners try to find
causalities in sets of observations and express the findings in simple
rules. One such rule could be, for example: “If an animal can fly and
has feathers, it is a bird”. That approach has the particular advantage of
being relatively easy to understand by humans. Contrast this with for
instance the hyperplane of a support vector machine, which is usually
much more difficult to understand, if at all possible. This property of
rules is both a psychological and a practical advantage. A psychologi-
cal advantage because people are more accepting of something they can
understand, and a practical advantage because it is possible to detect
unintended rules quickly, and define one’s own rules easily.
2.6. State of the Art for Usable Access
Control
Recent studies presented at CHI and SOUPS present challenges and
discuss solutions for managing access control mechanisms. They stress
that usability is fundamental for setting up manageable and secure ac-
cess control rule sets. In this section we summarize their findings.
Smetters and Good [Smetters and Good, 2009] study the level of con-
trol necessary for users by examining access control policies created by
users in a medium-size corporation. The access control policies regulate
access to data files that are stored in a document sharing system. The
system supports the creation of groups of users and implements RBAC.
The authors conclude that users rarely change access rights of files or
folders, and tend to store files in folders that have the appropriate ac-
cess control policy, as the files would inherit the folder’s access rights.
Further, users have complex access control policies resulting from the
creation of access control rules with unexpected effects and of redun-
dant rules that could be made much simpler [Smetters and Good, 2009].
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The particular needs and practices of access control in home environ-
ments are analyzed by Mazurek et al. [Mazurek et al., 2010]. Home en-
vironments are usually managed by users with limited or no knowledge
regarding the risks and technologies behind access control mechanisms.
Hence, they describe a contrasting scenario in comparison to Bauer et
al. [Bauer et al., 2009], as participants have no previous theoretical and
practical experience with access control mechanisms. We highlight two
of their conclusions regarding home users. First, home users desire ac-
cess control mechanisms with greater granularity (complexity) because
they allow to express complex scenarios more directly. Second, users
wish to have short and simple policy specifications. In this dissertation
we discuss those two apparently conflicting goals and how they both
can be achieved.
Errors in access control settings are evaluated by Egelman et al. [Egel-
man et al., 2011]. The authors examine how users implement access
control policies with the limited settings offered by Facebook. The par-
ticipants are Facebook users recruited from a higher education institu-
tion. The paper demonstrates that users are likely to introduce errors
in their access control rule sets, likely resulting in less restricted access
control policies than desired. The paper also emphasizes the importance
of offering feedback and guidance on how to correct access control rule
sets. Feedback with no guidance is proven to result in an increased
number of incorrect rules [Egelman et al., 2011].
Detection and resolution of conflicting access control rules has been
studied by Reeder et al. [Reeder et al., 2011]. In particular, the au-
thors target the problems of visualizing conflicts in access control rule
sets in Windows-based operating systems. They point out two particu-
lar weaknesses in the Windows conflict resolution method arising from
deny precedences2 and two-dimensional conflicts3. The authors propose
2DENY rules take precedence over ALLOW rules.
3Conflicts that cannot be solved using the specificity precedence method. This
method states that rules applied to more specific entities have precedence over
rules applied to less specific entities, i.e., user-related rules have precedence over
group-related rules [Reeder et al., 2011].
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more suitable methods to solve the aforementioned weaknesses, along
with a grid-like user interface [Reeder et al., 2008]. The interface is
used to show and manipulate permissions in a more intuitive way than
in the Windows standard interface [Reeder et al., 2011].
Dynamic creation of access control rules for computer file access is an-
alyzed by Mazurek et al. [Mazurek et al., 2011]. The objective of their
work is to evaluate the usability and general interest in a reactive ac-
cess control mechanism. In a reactive access control mechanism, users
who own data files receive email requests from others wanting to access
these files. Ad hoc decisions are taken by the file owners. Decisions
are either to ignore, allow or deny the received request. File owners
could also make ALLOW and DENY decisions permanent or temporary
for the current request. Reactive access control can be potentially an-
noying, as pointed out by the authors. The (albeit limited) monetary
incentive ($0.25/answer) and, more importantly, the limited time pe-
riod (one week) and relatively low and constant load of requests used
in the evaluation (15 requests/day) may have concealed some results
regarding the true annoyance of a reactive access control mechanism.
Furthermore, the creation of ad hoc access control rules can result in
unmanageable access control rule sets regarding our goals for usable
access control rule sets as described in Section 4.2.
2.7. Summary
In this chapter the background knowledge required to understand this
dissertation is presented. Starting with the vision of pervasive comput-
ing and the European project SmartProducts as an example, it continues
by describing the core security objectives: confidentiality, integrity, au-
thenticity, and authorization.
Access Control mechanisms are identified as mechanisms that often
need significant manual configuration because user preferences have to
be taken into account. A more detailed look into Access Control Mech-
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anisms is given since the main focus of this dissertation is about access
control rule set generation. The section on Rule Learning gives some
basic terms about the related field of machine learning. The chapter is
concluded with a state of the art analysis regarding usable security.
In the next chapter it is shown how usable security can be integrated
into smart products.
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3. Access Control for Smart
Products
Smart products are used as an example for a real life scenario which
has a high demand for usable access control since they are used and
configured by non-experts. Therefore, smart products are used as a mo-
tivation for Chapter 4, 5, and 6 as they demand a high level of usability
and usable access control rule sets are an important step to make the
configuration of access control mechanisms usable.
Smart products are built in a way that help customers, workers, and de-
signers to effectively use them. Therefore they have to maintain knowl-
edge about their environment, their capabilities, about the users, and
about interactions. This sensitive information needs to be protected.
Building appropriate security mechanisms for smart products has some
challenges that have to be considered when implementing usable secu-
rity for smart products, such as resource limitation, cooperative attacks
and casual users that require a high level of usability to succeed at ad-
ministrative tasks.
Section 3.1 lists those challenges as goals and presents and evaluates a
set of proposals to address them. In Section 3.2 those proposals are re-
fined to into usable security concepts for smart products. In Section 3.3
a design is given that integrates the concepts into a framework for smart
products. The chapter concludes with a proof-of-concept prototype and
functional tests for the components in Section 3.4.
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3.1. Challenges and Goals
In this section challenges of smart products are shown and taken into
consideration to develop an adapted vision of usable security for smart
products. Here we mainly focus on access control aspects. Other se-
curity issues like authentication of users, integrity, and confidentiality
are only described in a very basic way (see Section 2.2 and Sec-
tion 2.3). For more information about challenges regarding additional
security topics related to smart products, please refer to the EU re-
search projects MOSQUITO (http://www.mosquito-fp7.eu/), AWARE-
NESS (http://www.aware-project.eu/), PRIME (https://www.prime-
project.eu/) and PrimeLife (http://primelife.ercim.eu/).
In the process of the smart products requirement engineering, four as-
pects were identified that differentiate smart products from classical
products. Proactivity (see Proactive Knowledge in Section 2.1.1) re-
quires a high degree of automation and cooperation between smart prod-
ucts. Compared to home computers, they have less resources such as
computational power and storage. Since they are used by non-experts,
they need a high level of usability for user acceptance. These aspects
can be classified and interpreted for smart products security in the fol-
lowing way.
For the security aspects of smart products, the following two points are
considered in particular and detailed in Section 3.1.1:
• Cooperation: The privacy of the users has to be preserved and
the confidential data stored in smart products has to stay secret.
If smart products combine their capabilities, they increase the
chance to detect and prevent attacks.
• Preserve Resources: Security mechanisms need to minimize the
amount of computational resources like memory and computa-
tional power.
For the usability aspects of smart products, we focus in particular on the
following two points that are detailed in Section 3.1.2:
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• Automation: Automation should be used wherever it is possible,
to minimize the amount of interaction users need to perform.
• Reflect User Preferences: The preferences of a user have to be
reflected in the security mechanisms.
3.1.1. Security Aspects of Smart Products
The realization of security for the storage and distribution of proactive
knowledge (see Section 2.1.1) leads to a high number of interactions be-
tween the users, or devices representing them, and their smart products.
In addition, smart products deal with a large amount of confidential data
such as personal preferences and current whereabouts. Furthermore,
smart products also store confidential manufacturer information, e.g.,
maintenance and repair information. It should be ensured that no unau-
thorized entity can obtain data that is private to the user or manufacturer
[Iachello and Hong, 2007].
To protect the data, one has to precisely define which entities are al-
lowed (authorized) to do what on which data. This mechanism is called
authorization (see Section 2.2.4). Therefore, it is necessary to identify
the entities that want to access the data and to specify their rights. The
same applies to the secure distribution of data: on which devices can
the data be stored without any concerns, and which devices require spe-
cial mechanisms in order to protect the data? Solving that requires an
appropriate identity and rights management system like Attribute Based
Access Control (ABAC, see Section 2.4.4) [Artz and Gil, 2007, Gran-
dison and Sloman, 2000].
Preserve Resources
Limited resources of some smart products have to be considered when
designing security mechanisms for them. There are three different
facets to it. First, the security mechanisms need to have low resource
consumption. Second, denial-of-service attacks need to be considered
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especially. Third, it can be difficult for a single smart product to employ
complex attack detection algorithms.
Cooperation
IT security in ubiquitous computing, and for smart products in particu-
lar, is a difficult task because more systems also imply more and poten-
tial new weaknesses. Distributed and redundant data storage allow new
attacks that a single smart product cannot detect. Location information
is one such example. A single query is necessary for path finding or
getting local weather data. But if it happens over a period of time, it can
be an attack against location privacy. Especially cooperative attacks by
multiple attackers against smart products are difficult to handle, since
single request by different attackers are difficult to detect as an attack.
Thus, classical individual security concepts may not be sufficient for
smart products.
A promising approach is to defend collaboratively, too. Therefore we
recommend that smart products form a network of trusted devices con-
sisting of all the smart products of the same owner. This allows smart
products to combine their capabilities to defend against possible attacks
(see Trusted Networks in Section 3.2.2).
In addition, since smart products will often operate in insecure environ-
ments, information rights management alone is insufficient for preserv-
ing the user’s and manufacturer’s privacy. If an attacker is able to steal
the identity of a device that is already part of a trusted smart products
network, or if the attacker can manipulate a device to get control over
it, he can manipulate smart products with the full rights of the com-
promised device without being noticed. Rights management alone can
only work properly if the attacker is an identifiable, discrete entity in
the smart product network.
To defend against masquerading and exploitation of software and/or
hardware errors, intrusion detection is a possible solution. Intrusion
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detection allows finding misbehavior by comparing the actual behav-
ior of entities to their expected behavior. Therefore, intrusion detection
has the ability to detect disguised attackers as soon as they perform an
attack, that includes unexpected behavior. It acts as a second line of de-
fense after rights management which is especially important in a smart
product environment because of changing participants and the variety
of smart products.
3.1.2. Usability Aspects of Smart Products
The realization of security for the storage and distribution of proac-
tive knowledge as it relates to smart products, faces a lot of usability
challenges: smart products are intended to provide everyday support
to users, leading to a high number of interactions, that cannot be eas-
ily handled manually. Without a high degree of automation, users are
forced to configure security mechanisms of multiple devices or copy rel-
evant data from one device to another. In addition, users have to adapt
smart products to their own preferences. It is important to support the
users and not to overstrain them as motivated in Chapter 1.
Automation
The most usable security mechanism is one that would automatically
fulfill the user’s security expectations. Focusing on usability for smart
products, to get a high degree of user acceptance some particular con-
ditions have to be taken into consideration when designing and imple-
menting smart products. Smart products are tied into the user’s every-
day environment. A high degree of usability is indispensable for devices
that get used on a daily basis. If security mechanisms complicate every-
day tasks for users, they may try to deactivate the security as discussed
in chapter 1. Therefore, one goal is to integrate security directly into the
normal interactions that the user will perform anyway. For instance, it
should be sufficient to take the new device home and press two keys to
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add it to the network or to authenticate by touching your mobile phone
as it automatically scans your fingerprints.
In terms of access control, the challenge is that, in a fully connected
world, there are too many access requests to handle manually. This
problem can be minimized by automating access control decisions and
by automating the process of security configuration. Automating access
control decisions is commonly done by today’s access control mecha-
nisms. The configuration process, however, is still a challenge and is
discussed in Chapter 4, 5, and 6.
Reflect User Preferences
Some manual interaction is still necessary, especially when users have
to enforce individual preferences (see Section 2.3). The whereabouts
of, for instance, a taxi, might be publicly available, while the where-
abouts of a lawyer or a doctor that is visiting clients should be kept
private. Today, it is quite difficult to automate this. But it should be as
easy as possible for the users to make devices reflect their preferences.
Therefore, smart products require support mechanisms such as the us-
able security tools presented in Chapter 5 to reduce and simplify the
necessary user interactions by giving users the possibility to define ac-
cess control rules and, if possible, to generate them automatically (see
Chapter 7.4).
3.2. Concepts for SmartProducts Security
In this section the previously mentioned four goals from Section 3.1 -
Automation, Reflect User Preferences, Cooperation, and Preserve Re-
sources - are integrated into the concepts of Usable Access Control (see
3.2.1) and Layered and Cooperative Security (see 3.2.2). The relation-
ship between the basic ideas described in Section 3.1 and the concepts
can be seen in Table 3.1. Figure 3.2.1 describes in addition the relation-
ship to the design presented in Section 3.3.
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Table 3.1.: Basic Goals related to Concepts
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Usable Access Control x x x
3.2.1. Layered and Cooperative Security
A multilayer approach is envisioned for achieving a high level of secu-
rity and privacy in smart products. Since smart products are adaptive
devices, an AC mechanism with maximum flexibility is desirable. For
that reason, ABAC is an appropriate choice (see Section 2.4). Further-
more, for performance reasons a blacklist is used as a filter to keep
misbehaving entities away from deeper layers such as the ABAC. A
blacklist is simple and much faster than ABAC and especially than In-
trusion Detection Systems.
A problem occurs when an attacker is able to perform an impersonation
attack, i.e., steal the identity of a smart product or of an authorized user.
In this way the attacker would obtain the rights of the original entity and
can use these rights for further attacks. The attacker could also tamper
with and compromise smart products that are part of the network, and
monitor communications or propagate harmful messages in it. The goal
is to detect such hostile-acting entities for instance with an intrusion de-
tection system and to restrict their access rights or remove them entirely
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Figure 3.2.1.: Overview of Relationships between Goals, Concepts, and De-
sign
from the network by denying further communication with them [Debar
et al., 1999].
In addition to this vertical structure consisting of a blacklist, an ABAC
mechanism and an intrusion detection system, we also envision a hor-
izontal structure of defense to make the layers even stronger against
potential attacks. As depicted in Figure 3.2.2, the intrusion detection
systems of a set of trusted smart products detects misbehavior cooper-
atively. To determine the trustworthiness [Neisse et al., 2007] of smart
products, we propose that trusted nodes build up a virtual network, a so
called Trusted Network (TN).
In general, two classes of TNs can be distinguished: first, TNs com-
posed of devices that have the same owner; and second, TNs that are
composed of devices of the same manufacturer. Thus, every smart prod-
uct participates in two TNs. TNs are strictly separated from each other,
which means no confidential information is exchanged between TNs
(i.e., no transitivity). For example, the manufacturer is not able to ac-
cess the owner’s data and vice versa. Within a single TN, smart prod-
ucts can exchange confidential information like access rules (owner TN
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 Figure 3.2.2.: Vertical and Horizontal Security Layers
or manufacturer TN), user profiles (owner TN), or manufacturer data
(manufacturer TN). To implement the idea of TNs, smart products of
the same TN have a pre-shared secret. This pre-shared secret is sent to
every smart product after it is bought and activated for the first time. In
this process, the user has to verify that this new smart product is allowed
to integrate itself into the owner’s TN. This can be done manually, e.g.,
with out of bound communication, or automatically with the help of a
minimal entity (ME). Overall, this is similar to the Resurrecting Duck-
ling Model proposed by [Stajano, 2002].
If an entity is observed to act in an improper manner (e.g., multiple
attempts of accessing a forbidden resource or a denial-of-service attack)
by the intrusion detection system, it will get a temporary or permanent
entry in the blacklist and will be blocked as long as the entry exists.
To maintain the usability of the overall security concept, an appropriate
management interface is required that allows the user to edit a smart
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product’s blacklist. The specification of this interface is a subject for
future research.
3.2.2. Usable Access Control
Access rights have to be managed in a usable manner. Since access
rights in a smart product network may change over time, it is necessary
for the assignment of rights to be clearly displayed and easily change-
able by authorized entities [Cranor and Garfinkel, 2005].
As described in Section 1.1, usable access control rule sets are rule sets
that
• (i) reflect access control policies correctly, and
• (ii) are easy to manage and understand according to expert opin-
ions.
The concept of Usable Access Control is explained and detailed in
Chapter 4, 5, and 6. These chapters focus on the administration of ac-
cess control rule sets and introduce a formal approach to dealing with
usability challenges. The vision is to enable Interactive Rule Learning
for the generation and configuration of access control rule sets in the
future (see Section 7.4).
3.3. SmartProducts Security Design
A usable access control mechanism for smart products is being im-
plemented as a component of the SmartProducts software platform
[Schreiber et al., 2011], part of the SmartProducts project funded by
the European Commission’s 7th Framework Programme. In this section
we give an overview of the design of the Access Manager component
in the SmartProducts software platform. The objective of this platform
is to provide an open framework for developers to design hardware and
implement applications for smart products. The Access Manager com-
ponent is mainly responsible for the authentication, access control and
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Figure 3.3.1.: Access Manager Architecture.
security administration for smart products. Figure 3.3.1 depicts the ar-
chitecture of the Access Manager component. This diagram and the
following diagrams in this chapter are presented using the FMC nota-
tion [Keller and Wendt, 2003].
The Access Manager has interfaces to the Communication Middleware,
which handles all communications outside the device, and to the Ubiq-
uitous Data Store, which implements an interface to one or more data
stores. The Access Manager has three sub-components: Authentication,
Access Handling and Security Administration. The functionality of the
aforementioned sub-components is summarized below:
• The Authentication sub-component handles multiple authentica-
tion mechanisms, thus enabling device and user authentication
such as biometric authentication. It is responsible for authenticat-
ing entities, such as users and devices. The authentication com-
ponent is out of the scope of this dissertation and it is not going
to be further detailed; it is only mentioned for the sake of com-
Matthias Beckerle Dissertation Usable Access Control
62 3. Access Control for Smart Products
pleteness. Regardless, it is a fundamental building block of the
security architecture for smart products.
• The Access Handling (AH) sub-component manages the black-
list and the ABAC (see Section 2.4). It implements the Layered
and Cooperative Security concept (see Section 3.2.1). The AH is
described in detail in section 3.3.1.
• The Security Administration (SA) sub-component implements the
rights management part of the Usable Access Control concept. It
is the component where the Interactive Rule Learning (see Chap-
ter 7.4) will take place. The SA is described in detail in section
3.3.2.
3.3.1. SmartProducts Access Handling
The Access Handling ensures that only authorized entities are able
to access the proactive knowledge, which is basically a secure dis-
tributed database for Resource Description Framework data and key-
value pairs1. It filters every request through a set of rules and forwards
only those requests that are deemed to be legitimate. The Access Han-
dling component is depicted in Figure 3.3.2. This section is divided into
two parts: the first part describes the access handling components, and
a use case is illustrated in the second part.
Access Handling Subcomponents
The Access Handling component is composed of the Access Handler
subcomponent (AH) , the Blacklist Handler subcomponent (BH), the
Access Control subcomponent (AC), and the Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem subcomponent (IDS), which are detailed next.
1More information is available on the SmartProducts project website:
www.smartproducts-project.eu.
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Figure 3.3.2.: Access Handling Component Overview.
Access Handler Subcomponent The AH is the interface for han-
dling access requests. It forwards requests to the BH and informs the
requesting entity about the outcome of the request. If an access request
was authorized by the Access Handling component, it will be forwarded
to the Ubiquitous Data Store. If it is necessary to send data back to the
requesting entity to fulfill the request, the data goes through the AH.
Blacklist Handler Subcomponent The BH is the first of the three
rule-based access control mechanisms. It blocks every request from en-
tities which are listed in the General Blacklist database. If the requesting
entity is not blocked, the request is forwarded to AC for further exami-
nation.
Access Control Subcomponent The AC checks if a request corre-
sponds with the access rights of the requesting entity. All access rights
are read from the AC Rules database. If an access is refused, the ID
of the requesting entity will likely be added to the general blacklist
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database for a period of time. If an entity often tries to access a re-
source it has no authorization for, it will be added to the general black-
list database. In case a request was blocked because of a blacklist entry,
no information will be sent back to the requester. Otherwise the AH
informs the requesting entity that it was blocked. If a rule exists that
allows the requesting entity to access the requested resource the request
is forwarded to the IDS.
Intrusion Detection System Subcomponent The IDS verifies
that an access request does not deviate from the expected behavior of
the requesting entity. The expected behavior is stored in the behavior
whitelist database. If an access request is determined to be abnormal,
the IDS asks the IDS of other smart products around for help. The IDSs
around combine their knowledge about the requesting entity to deter-
mine if the entity is the one it claims to be. The outcome will be used to
update the database for better future results and is also forwarded to the
AH. The IDS should ideally be able to exchange information with IDSs
on other smart products in order to cooperatively detect intrusions. The
design and implementation of the IDS component is out of the scope of
this dissertation.
Use Case
In this use case, a user requests information from a smart product. To
decide whether a data access may take place, the respective request must
pass through all subcomponents of the Access Handling component.
Only when all subcomponents approve the right to access the data, the
request will be forwarded from the AH to the Ubiquitous Data Store.
This use case is depicted in Figure 3.3.3.
3.3.2. Security Administration
The Security Administration component contains the Rule Handler sub-
component (RH) – a bidirectional interface for rule updates between the
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Figure 3.3.3.: Access Handling Use Case.
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Figure 3.3.4.: Security Administration Module.
owner, the manufacturer and the Access Handling of the smart prod-
uct. The RH maintains three databases for the different Access Han-
dling subcomponent. Every smart product in the same Trusted Network
[Beckerle, 2011a] of the owner has the same owner-specific access rules
for redundancy and as a measure against simple manipulation. To help
the user define suitable rules, a new research topic called Interactive
Rule Learning will be investigated in the future (see Section 7.4). The
Security Administration Module is depicted in Figure 3.3.4. This sec-
tion is divided into two parts: the first part describes the Security Ad-
ministration components, and a use case is presented in the second part.
Security Administration Components
The Security Administration component consists of the Rule Handler
subcomponent (RH), the set of access control rules, the blacklist and
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the whitelist. The RH exchanges information with the Minimum Entity
(ME). A description of the RH and the ME are provided below.
Rule Handler The RH manages the three databases: the general
blacklist, AC rules, and behavior whitelist. The general blacklist is used
by the BH and contains the identities of blocked entities. There are two
databases for AC rules: the first database contains user-defined access
rules, and the second database consists of manufacturer-defined access
rules that are required for maintenance (e.g., firmware updates). The be-
havior whitelist has rules that describe the normal behavior of entities
interacting with the smart product, and is needed for the IDS.
The RH communicates with the Minimal Entity (ME) or an equiva-
lent device to support the user’s management of the different databases.
This is envisioned to be done with the support of Interactive Rule-
Learning (see Section 7.4 and [Beckerle, 2011a]). The manufacturer
of the smart product is only able to update the manufacturer-defined
AC rule database.
ME The ME is a device that represents the user in the digital world. It
is used to easily authenticate the user (out of scope) and serves as a user
interface for configuring the RH. Alternatively, this functionality can be
integrated in a smart product. MEs are not the focus of this dissertation
on are only mentioned for completeness. More information about MEs
can be found in [Beckerle, 2011a]
3.4. SmartProducts Desing Evaluation
The evaluation of the design of the Access Manager takes place in two
ways: a proof-of-concept prototype that is described in Section 3.4.1
and functional tests of the implementation of the SmartProducts security
design in Section 3.4.2.
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3.4.1. Proof-of-Concept Prototype
Figure 3.4.1.: Cocktail Companion Overview
The first part evaluates the interoperability of the access manager in
a prototype named Cocktail Companion, developed by TU-Darmstadt,
that functions as a proof-of-concept (see Figure 3.4.1).
The Cocktail Companion guides the user in choosing and mixing cock-
tails. The list of cocktails shown depends on the user’s age (alcoholic or
non alcoholic cocktails), the available ingredients, and the user’s pref-
erences that are stored in the user profile. Alice, Bob, and Charly as
adults get all available cocktails on the screen. Denise as a child sees
only the cocktails without alcohol (see Figure 3.4.2).
The user authenticates at the Cocktail Companion by using RFID tags.
After a successful authentication, the Cocktail Companion sends a re-
quest for the available cocktails to the Access Manager. The Access
Manager adds a list of credentials with the access rights of the authen-
ticated user to the request and forwards it to the Ubiquitous Storage.
The Ubiquitous Storage forwards it to the Proactive Knowledge Base,
which collects the data with consideration to the credentials. Afterward
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Figure 3.4.2.: Access Manager: Proof-of-Concept
the data is sent back to the Ubiquitous Storage, which forwards it to the
Access Manager, which forwards it to the Cocktail Companion.
Alice and Charly have the attribute “adult”, while Denise has the at-
tribute “child”. The applicable access control rule set describes that
adults have access to all cocktails that are located in the columns
“Adult” and “Child”. Denise, as a child, only has access to cocktails
stored in the column called “Child” (see Figure 3.4.2).
This scenario is used for the functional tests in Section 3.4.2 (for more
information regarding the Cocktail Companion and other trials see
[Kasten et al., 2012]).
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Table 3.2.: Access Control Functional Test Cases
ID Test Case Description
Wanted
Outcome
Result
Sec.
JUnit.
28
Get
credentials
for adults
Access
credentials Test
for Alice, Bob,
and Charly. The
access control
mechanism
extracts all
relevant
credentials out of
the access rules
and returns them.
Credentials
Child and
Adult are
returned
Success
Sec.
JUnit.
29
Get
credentials
for children
Access
credentials Test
for Denise. The
access control
mechanism
extracts all
relevant
credentials out of
the access rules
and returns them.
Only
credential
Child is
returned
Success
Sec.
JUnit.
30
Blocking
blacklisted
entity
The Access
Manager shall
block blacklisted
entities without
checking for
credentials. In
this test case
Charly is
blacklisted for
the purpose of
testing.
Charly is
blocked
and gets no
credentials.
Success
Sec.
JUnit.
31
Get actual
user
The Access
Manager shall
return the actual
authenticated
user.
The actual
user is
returned
Success
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3.4.2. Functional Test Cases & Results
For the functional evaluation, JUnit2 tests were written. The access con-
trol tests cover the main functionality of the access control: providing
credentials and blocking hostile entities. The tests are using the scenario
described in Section 3.4.1. Table 3.2 provides a more detailed explana-
tion of the test cases. A brief description is given as well as the wanted
outcome and the result based on the implementation. The ID refers to
the ID used in the SmartProduct testing framework.
3.5. Summary
This chapter describes the basic ideas surrounding particular challenges
for smart product security: automation is needed to not ovestrain the
user by minimizing interactions, in addition, it must be easy for the user
to introduce their own preferences into the security system. Limited
resources have to be considered when designing security mechanisms,
especially to defend against denial-of-service attacks. By giving smart
products the possibility to exchange information, a cooperative defense
is still possible where single smart products would fail.
The basic ideas are integrated into two concept descriptions. The first
concept focuses on security aspects and the second one on usability as-
pects for smart products. By using a multilayer defense system in smart
products, it is possible to combine very fast mechanisms like a black-
list with more sophisticated mechanisms such as ABAC and intrusion
defense. This helps to defend with minimal resource usage while retain-
ing maximum data security. To obtain a usable security system, usable
access control is integrated into smart products, allowing for their easy
configuration.
2see http://junit.org/ for more details
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We show how this concept can be integrated into the smart products
framework by describing the design of the Access Manager that was
implemented in the SmartProducts EU project.
The Cocktail Companion is described as a proof-of-concept to give an
example for a usable smart product that is functionally reliant on the
Access Manager. At the end of this chapter we provide functional tests
of the Access Manager’s functionality.
More details about SmartProducts can be found at www.smartproducts-
project.eu.
The next chapter informally identifies requirements to make access con-
trol rule sets usable.
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4. Informal Requirements for
Usable AC Rule Sets
In the access control system for Smart Products, as well as for many
types of access control systems (e.g., for Windows and Linux file sys-
tem, social network access rights, home automation) access control
rules are used to specify the policy that the system will enforce. This
chapter will show that the usability of access control rule sets is key to
the usability of access control systems that use them. Unusable access
control rule sets lead to a higher level of security and usability.
In this chapter, combined with Chapter 5, we research what exact char-
acteristics usable access control rule sets have and how they can be de-
scribed. We summarize the limitations, problems and findings identi-
fied in the Background section and in our pilot study seen in the next
section, and organize them into a concise set of six goals for building
usable access control rule sets. This set of goals is then formalized in
Chapter 5 using formal logic. Formal logic and user studies are used
to corroborate the identified goals for usable access control. A formal
definition can also be used to build up a computational system that can
analyze, measure and offer guidance for setting up manageable access
control rule sets.
4.1. Pilot Study
We started with a pilot study which consisted of semi-structured inter-
views with IT support professionals, i.e., experts. The objectives were
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to list the usability challenges related to management of access control
rule sets and to look at how the participants handled those challenges.
4.1.1. Methodology
The participants were all IT support professionals (system administra-
tors). They were recruited from business and public sectors (universi-
ties). Seven IT support professionals from four different organizations
were interviewed. All of them managed Linux- or Windows-based ac-
cess control mechanisms, using tools and services like Active Directory,
iptables, and firewalls. No financial incentive was offered to the par-
ticipants1.
We used semi-structured interviews as our method of inquiry in the pi-
lot study. This method provided us the flexibility to ask for details re-
garding the challenges faced when managing access control rule sets.
The interviews were individual and carried out under the condition that
anonymity would be preserved (access control rule set details are usu-
ally confidential). All interviews were digitally recorded. We started by
asking the participants about their position in the organization hierarchy
and about their main tasks related to access control management.
We asked about potential problems that occur when new access control
rules are defined and when existing rule sets have to be changed. Fur-
thermore, we asked what types of errors can occur in these processes
and how they are avoided or circumvented.
4.1.2. Results
All participants of our pilot study reported strict procedures for manag-
ing user rights. Changes or adjustments in the access control rule set
were discussed in meetings with other system administrators. A system
1We however promised the participants to inform them first-hand about our findings
and conclusions.
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administrator from an organization with about 1 000 employees esti-
mated that one full work day is spent on such meetings every month.
The administrator reported that these regular meetings were considered
to be of high importance for the organization and the main objective
was to guarantee the understandability and manageability of the access
control rule set.
The participants also stressed the existence of two general kinds of chal-
lenges regarding the management of access control rule sets.
First, rule sets need to be restrictive and at the same time allow legiti-
mate access:
• (G1) Rule sets have to deny unauthorized access.
• (G2) Rule sets have to grant authorized access.
i.e., all allowed accesses should be authorized and no gaps for unautho-
rized access should exist.
Second, rule sets needed to be understandable and manageable to help
system administrators verify that the existing policies are implemented
correctly2. The participants reported a series of potential problem
sources in access control rule sets that resulted in poor manageability.
We organized those sources into the following goals:
• (G3) Redundant rules need to be removed.
• (G4) Contradictory rules need to be removed.
• (G5) Concise rule sets are better than large rule sets.
• (G6) Rule sets are easier to manage when they have been designed
to facilitate the administrators’ work of adding/removing users
to/from rule sets.
A more detailed description of G1 to G6 that also takes related work
into account can be found in Section 4.3.
The participants were also asked about the usability of different access
control mechanisms. They all pointed out that indirect access control
2The distinction between policy makers and implementers identified by Bauer et al.
[Bauer et al., 2009] maps directly to these two challenges.
Matthias Beckerle Dissertation Usable Access Control
76 4. Informal Requirements for Usable AC Rule Sets
mechanisms (like RBAC and ABAC) are more usable than direct access
ones (like access control lists [Brand, 1985]). However, they acknowl-
edged that the task of translating entity-file access decisions (e.g., user
x is allowed to access file y) is more difficult in RBAC and ABAC than
in the other access control mechanisms.
In the next two sections, we summarize the problems and findings iden-
tified in our pilot study and in the background Chapter 2 and describe
the aforementioned six goals for building usable access control rule sets
in more detail.
4.2. Definition of Goals
We define the goals in terms of ownership, objects and access control
rules. Owners can grant or deny access to objects using access control
rules. Objects are resources such as data files, data folders, or physical
rooms. Access control rules are written in terms of ALLOW or DENY
decisions. The six goals identified are:
4.2.1. (G1) Allow no more than the owner wants
to be allowed.
This goal defines that a resource should be accessed only by people
that are intended to have access to it. Allowing more than intended is
the result of insufficient restrictive or missing access rules. Insufficient
restrictive access rules are a likely consequence of errors introduced by
owners as shown by Egelman et al. in their study with Facebook users
[Egelman et al., 2011]. This problem is also identified in [Smetters and
Good, 2009] in its analysis of documents with public access.
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4.2.2. (G2) Allow everything the owner wants to
be allowed.
This goal states that a resource must be available to the people that
are intended to have access to it. This goal basically complements G1.
Allowing less than the intended access is the result of too restrictive
access rules. Too restrictive access rules occur when the initial access
control policy is insufficient as shown in [Mazurek et al., 2010].
4.2.3. (G3) Make sure that a rule is not fully
covered by another rule of the same rule set.
Redundant rules increase the complexity of an access control rule set by
introducing new rules that are already covered by existing rules, thereby
reducing the manageability of the access control system. Redundancies
account for one of the reasons leading to errors in access control deci-
sions [Smetters and Good, 2009].
4.2.4. (G4) Two rules within the same rule set
must not conflict.
Conflicting access control rules impair the understandability of a rule
set and often increase its complexity. Moreover, the resulting action
from such rules will depend on the implementation of the access con-
trol mechanism’s conflict-resolution method. Deny precedence implies
that Deny rules take precedence over Allow rules. Allow precedence
implies the opposite. The order of appearance in the rule set can be
used to define the precedence too, i.e., the first fitting rule is picked.
Conflict-resolution in Windows-based systems was studied by Reeder et
al. [Reeder et al., 2011], who propose a new conflict-resolution method.
Reeder et al. conclude that methods have inherent trade-offs as no
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method is able to always deliver the desired set of permissions. In our
pilot study, we confirmed the findings of Reeder et al. The IT support
professionals interviewed in our pilot study stated that conflicting rules
were the most annoying issue in terms of maintainability. Optimizing
G4 can conflict with optimizing G5 (see Section 6.4).
4.2.5. (G5) Minimize the number of rule set
elements.
Minimizing the size of rule sets reduces their complexity and facilitates
visual inspection. Complexity was identified as a major problem in the
manageability of access control rule sets in the user studies of Smetters
and Good [Smetters and Good, 2009] and of Mazurek et al. [Mazurek
et al., 2010] who evaluated distinct test environments (a medium-size
corporation and home settings, respectively). After removing redun-
dancies (G3) and (in some cases) eliminating conflicts (G4), the size of
a rule set can be further optimized. One way to further optimize accord-
ing to G5 is to grant rights based on attributes instead of unique iden-
tifiers (granting access rights for Students is one access rule – granting
access right for individual students by using the matriculation number
requires a rule for every student), by reducing the amount of attributes
per rule and avoiding unnecessary rules. But unlike G3, this procedure
can lead to other conflicts, e.g., opening gaps for intruders.
4.2.6. (G6) Minimize maintenance effort in a
changing system.
Minimizing maintenance effort of an access control rule set with con-
stantly changing access control policies requires the set to be manage-
able and understandable i.e., Goals G3, G4, and G5 indirectly help G6.
Most of the changes in the rule set happen when access control policies
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are modified, or when users are added to or removed from the system.
Overfitting rule sets results in increased maintenance effort3.
4.3. On Goals and Derived Metrics
G1 and G2 are security related goals, as they express access control
decisions. The manageability of rule sets is reflected in goals G3 to G6.
All six goals for building usable access control rule sets need to be taken
into account when creating new or evaluating existing rule sets. The
need to evaluate all goals is a result of the non-orthogonality between
the goals. Optimizing one goal might lead to a degradation of other
goals in some cases, or might have a positive correlation in other cases.
An example of trade-offs between goals was presented in Section 4.2
on the relation between G5 and G3.
This relationship between goals can be illustrated as follows. G2 can be
maximized by defining a general Allow decision for every request. This
solution conflicts with G1, as it may allow more than the owner wants
to be allowed.
Reactive access control is another example that showed the relationship
between our stated goals [Mazurek et al., 2011]. It allows changes to
be made in the access control list according to the most current access
control policy. Access control policies are defined by the owner on an
ad hoc basis. Thus, G2 is influenced positively as everything the owner
wants to be allowed is allowed.4 However, negative effects on goals
G3, G4, G5 and G6 would manifest due to drawbacks in reactive access
control, such as the lack of consistency checks in the resulting access
control rule set, the probable creation of redundant and conflicting rules,
and the potential annoyance of having to make ad hoc decisions regard-
ing access control requests.
3We use the term overfitting according to its machine learning definition. In the
scope of this dissertation, it means that rule sets that perform well at the current
state of the system may perform poorly if the system is modified.
4There are no guarantees that reactive access control maximizes G2 since DENY
decisions may have permanent effects.
Matthias Beckerle Dissertation Usable Access Control
80 4. Informal Requirements for Usable AC Rule Sets
The fulfillment of the goals can also be used to reduce mismatches be-
tween people’s mental models of access control mechanisms and their
actual implementation, which is a problem identified by Mazurek et
al. [Mazurek et al., 2010]. Such mismatches can be reduced if users are
able to verify the implemented policies and compare the actual imple-
mentation with the desired policies.
4.4. Summary
In this chapter we answered the research question: “What are the re-
quirements for usable access control rule set configuration?”
A pilot study consisting of semi-structured interviews with IT experts
was performed. The gathered information was refined into six informal
goals for usable access control rule sets:
(G1) Allow not more than the owner wants to be allowed.
(G2) Allow everything the owner wants to be allowed.
(G3) A rule must not be fully covered by another rule of the same
rule set.
(G4) Two rules within the same rule set must not conflict.
(G5) Minimize the number of rule set elements.
(G6) Minimize the maintenance effort in a changing system.
In Chapter 5 these informal goals are stated more precisely by using
mathematical descriptions.
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5. Quantifiable Metrics and
Sets for Usable AC Rule
Sets
In this chapter, we formalize the goals G1 to G6 and define the math-
ematical foundations of our approach. We first describe the building
blocks that are needed to formalize ABAC, which is used as a reference
system for further definitions. This formalization is based on the for-
malization seen in [Yuan and Tong, 2005a] but build to be minimal and
focused on the goals. The formalization provides the sets, metrics and
optimization criteria that are used to evaluate the usability of an access
control rule set.
The following nomenclature is used in this section:
• x ∈ X denotes that x is an element of set X .
• |X | is the cardinality of set X (with a single exception in Section
5.4 for |SG5| where a different definition is used).
• ℘(X) is the powerset of set X .
• X×Y is the Cartesian product of set X and set Y .
• X ⊆ Y denotes that set X is a subset of set Y .
• X ⊇ Y denotes that set X is a superset of set Y .
• X ∪Y is the union of set Y and set X .
• X4Y is the symmetric difference (XOR) of set X and set Y .
• X \Y is the relative complement of set Y in set X .
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In addition the existential quantifier ∃ and the logical conjunction ∧ are
used.
5.1. Basic Building Blocks
The basis for the formalization is given with the following definitions.
We follow the general set nomenclature, where capital letters refer to
sets and non-capital letters to single elements. All sets are assumed to
be finite.
Definition 1. Entities.
An entity is a subject, e.g., a person, that could be granted access to an
object. The set of all entities is referred to as W (all possible entities,
i.e., “the World”). The set E describes all entities in a system S, where
W ⊇E. The set B describes the set of owners of a system, where W ⊇B.
Definition 2. Attributes.
Attributes are properties of entities such as ID number, age, gender,
roles or security level. The set of all attributes is referred to as A˚ and a
subset of A˚ is called A.
Definition 3. Objects.
Objects are anything that access rights can be assigned to, e.g., a file or
directory. The set of all objects is referred to as O, the set of all objects
in a system is called D (e.g., “Data” in form of all files of an informa-
tion system), and the subsets of D are named H (e.g., a subdirectory or
“hierarchy” in a Windows-based system). In short: O⊇ D⊇ H.
Definition 4. Set of Access Decisions.
There are two possible outcomes for an access request: allow or deny.
We refer to the set of access decisions as Z = {−1,1}, where−1 means
DENY and 1 means ALLOW.
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5.2. Derived Building Blocks
The following building blocks are constructed using the basic building
blocks introduced above.
Definition 5. Rule and Rule Set.
A rule describes the relation between single attributes, objects, and ac-
cess decisions and is written as a 3-tuple. For instance, the rule ({Stu-
dents},{Printer},1) states that entities with the attribute Students are al-
lowed to access the object Printer. A list R of n rules is called a rule set.
We use the following notation: R = (r1, . . . ,rn), where ri = (Ai,Hi,zi)
and ri refers to the ith rule of the rule set R. Hi refers to subsets of D,
and Ai refers to subsets of A˚.
Definition 6. System.
A system S is an environment described by a quadruple that consists
of two sets of entities E and B, a set of objects D, and a set of access
control rules R. It is defined as:
S = (B,E,D,R) ∈℘(W )×℘(W )×℘(O)× (℘(A˚)×℘(D)×Z)n,
where B denotes the set of owners of the system, i.e., the entities that
define the access control rules for this system and n = |R|.
Further, we define two functions. Function fA is used for extracting all
attributes from an entity. Function frequest provides access decisions.
Definition 7. Attribute Extraction Function fA.
The attribute extraction function is defined as:
fA : W →℘(A˚),w 7→ fA(w) := Aw.
It returns the set of attributes Aw that belong to entity w.
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Definition 8. Access Decision Function frequest.
Let w be the requesting entity and Hw be the requested information i.e.,
a set of Objects. Let zdefault denote the default access decision in case
that no rule is applicable to an access request, n denote the number of
rules in R and i ∈ N, 1 ≤ i. The access decision function frequest is
defined as follows:
frequest(w,Hw) := freq( fA(w),Hw,1) or
frequest(Aw,Hw) := freq(Aw,Hw,1), where
freq : (℘(A˚)×℘(D)×N→ Z,(Aw,Hw, i) 7→ freq(Aw,Hw, i)
freq(Aw,Hw, i) :=

zdefault i f (i > n),
z
i f Aw ⊇ Ai,Hw ⊆ Hi
.(Ai,Hi,zi) = ri,
freq(Aw,Hw, i+1) else.
For most systems, one would typically use zdefault = −1. n denotes the
number of rules in the rule set.
Up to this point, we have provided a formalization of ABAC. In order
to be able to evaluate whether a given rule set actually fits the system
owners’ intention, we provide a notation with regard to the intended
behavior of the access control mechanism.
Definition 9. Owners’ Intention.
The function fintended specifies the owners’ intention with regard to ac-
cess control decisions and is given as:
fintended : (W ×℘(D))→ Z,(w,H) 7→ fintended(w,H)
fintended(w,H) :=
1 if b ∈ B wants frequest(w,H) = 1,−1 else.
In practice, it can be challenging to acquire the function fintended. A
possible solution could be to observe system usage over a period of
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time and use this information to approximate fintended. More thoughts
about the owners’ intention can be found in Chapter 7.
5.3. Access Decision Sets
Before we concisely formalize the goals G1 to G6, we need to define
eight access decision sets divided into two collections of four sets each.
The first collection relates to the entities that are known as part of the
system S, whereas the second collection relates to all entities that could
be part of the system in the future which is required to address the prob-
lem of generalization of rule sets. In each collection two sets describe
the owners intention and two how the system actually decides (for each
one for allows and one for denies).
Definition 10. System Access Decision Sets.
The two sets MEAllowand MEDeny contain all entity, object tuples for
which the access decision function frequest would grant (MEAllow) or deny
(MEDeny ) access. The elements e are all elements of Set E and therefore
part of the system.
The two sets MEWanted and MEUnwanted contain all entity, object tuples for
which the owner intends to grant (MEWanted ) or deny (MEUnwanted ) access.
MEAllow = {(e,d)| frequest( fA(e),{d}) = 1},
MEDeny = {(e,d)| frequest( fA(e),{d}) =−1},
MEWanted = {(e,d)| fintended( fA(e),{d}) = 1},
MEUnwanted = {(e,d)| fintended( fA(e),{d}) =−1}.
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Definition 11. World Access Decision Sets.
The four sets described here are defined parallel to the sets in definition
10. The only difference is that now all entities are considered (w ∈W ).
MWAllow = {(w,d)| frequest( fA(w),{d}) = 1},
MWDeny = {(w,d)| frequest( fA(w),{d}) =−1},
MWWanted = {(w,d)| fintended( fA(w),{d}) = 1},
MWUnwanted = {(w,d)| fintended( fA(w),{d}) =−1}.
5.4. Security and Usability Metrics
The Definitions 1 to 11 are used to formally define the sets SGi, where
1≤ i≤ 6. The sets SGi correspond to the security and usability metrics
related to the goals Gi. The elements of a set SGi are the rules that
contradict a goal Gi.
The criteria to achieve a goal Gi is therefore to minimize the number
of elements in SGi: minimize(|SGi|). The following definitions can be
used to rate the usability of an access control rule set or to compare two
different rule sets. The formalized definitions for SGi are:
(SG1) Cases where too much is allowed (allow not more than the owners
want to be allowed):
SG1 = MEAllow \MEWanted .
(SG2) Cases where too little is allowed (allow everything the owners
want to be allowed):
SG2 = MEWanted \MEAllow.
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(SG3) Unnecessary rules (a rule must not be fully covered by another
rule of the same rule set):
SG3 ={(ri,r j). 0 < i≤ n−1 ∧ i < j ≤ n
∧ A j ⊇ Ai ∧ H j ⊆ Hi ∧ z j = zi}.
(SG4) Contradictory rules (two rules within the same rule set must not
conflict):
SG4 ={(ri,r j). 0 < i≤ n−1 ∧ i < j ≤ n ∧ ∃(e,h)
.( fA(e)⊇ Ai,h⊆ Hi,z) ∃( fA(e)⊇ A j,h⊆ H j,−z)}.
With regard to SG4, the default access decision zde f ault is not considered
a contradiction since it is not part of the rule set itself.
(SG5) Number of rules in the rule set (minimize the complexity of rules
and rule set):
SG5 = R, and
|SG5| := ∑
(Ai,Hi,Zi)∈R
|Ai|+ |Hi|+1.
It is important to notice that our definition here overrides the default
cardinality operator.
(SG6) Cases that will lead to wrong access decisions in the future (min-
imize the maintenance effort in a changing system):
SG6 = MWAllow4MWWanted ∪MWDeny4MWUnwanted .
In practice it is very difficult to build the set SG6, since it takes into ac-
count a future state as it considers entities that are not yet part of the
system, but are going to join it at a future time. The fields of knowledge
engineering and machine learning refer to this problem as the gener-
alization or overfitting problem [Mitchell, 1997]. The interviews with
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IT support professionals in the pilot study (and informal discussions
with scientists from the knowledge engineering field) indicate that an
optimized |SG3|, |SG4|, and |SG5| would have a positive effect on |SG6|
(e.g., minimizing the rule set leads to more general rules that are less
overfitting).
5.5. The Cost of Wrong Access Decisions
The two types of failures related to access control decisions are: de-
cisions that should have been denied but were not, i.e., the elements
in SG1, or decisions that should have been allowed but were not, i.e.,
the elements in SG2. Naturally, the consequences of failures vary e.g.,
granting access to a confidential file carries a higher cost than granting
access to a non-critical system file. To capture such distinctions between
different failures regarding their impact on the system or its users, the
function
fSG1 : D→ R,d 7→ fSG1(d)
is used to get the cost of an incorrect allow and
fSG2 : D→ R,d 7→ fSG2(d)
is used to get the cost of an incorrect deny.
The value costSG1 , which is related to SG1 (incorrect allows) and at-
tributed to an access control rule set, is
costSG1 = ∑
d∈X
fSG1(d),
where X = {d|(e,d) ∈MEAllow \MEWanted}.
And the value costSG2 , which is related to SG2 (incorrect denies) and
attributed to an access control rule set, is
costSG2 = ∑
d∈Y
fSG2(d),
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Table 5.1.: Security and Usability Metrics: SGi
SG1 = MEAllow \MEWanted
SG2 = MEWanted \MEAllow
SG3 = {(ri,r j). 0 < i≤ n−1 ∧ i < j ≤ n
∧ A j ⊇ Ai ∧ H j ⊆ Hi ∧ z j = zi}
SG4 = {(ri,r j). 0 < i≤ n−1 ∧ i < j ≤ n ∧ ∃(e,h)
.( fA(e)⊇ Ai,h⊆ Hi,z) @( fA(e)⊇ A j,h⊆ H j,−z)}
SG5 = R, and |SG5| := ∑
(Ai,Hi,Zi)∈R
|Ai|+ |Hi|+1
SG6 = MWAllow4MWWanted ∪MWDeny4MWUnwanted
where Y = {d|(e,d) ∈MEWanted \MEAllow}.
Finally, we define total cost = costSG1 + costSG2 .
5.6. Summary
In this chapter the requirements presented in chapter 4 are formalized
into quantifiable metrics and sets SGi as seen in Table 5.1. A metric for
each requirements is defined as the cardinality of the sets |SGi|. |SG5|
has a slightly adjusted definition to optimize the explanatory power of
the metric. The sets |SGi| have to be minimized to optimize security and
usability of the corresponding access control rule set.
The next chapter presents the evaluation of the formalization, which is
achieved with the help of two user studies.
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6. Evaluation of Formal
Metrics and Sets
In this chapter we evaluate the formalization presented in chapter 5.
Three hypotheses are tested:
Hypothesis H1: The sets and metrics help users produce better rule sets.
Hypothesis H2: The usability scores computed using the metrics in
Chapter 5 correspond to rankings obtained from IT support profession-
als when evaluating the translation of policies into access control rule
sets (related to G1 and G2).
Hypothesis H3: The usability scores computed using the metrics in
Chapter 5 correspond to rankings obtained from IT support profession-
als when evaluating the understandability and manageability of access
control rule sets (related to G3, G4 and G5).
These hypotheses are tested with the help of two user studies.
In User Study 1 (see Section 6.2.1), participants were asked to complete
a computer-assisted task regarding the optimization of an access control
rule set. Two test conditions were used for completing the task: without
the sets and metrics (WOS) and with support of the sets and metrics
(WS). Our results show that users implement significantly better rule
sets when supported by tools that provide the measurements SGi and
|SGi| from chapter 5.
In User Study 2 (see Section 6.2.2), the participants were IT support
professionals. They were asked to evaluate and rank the rule sets that
were obtained from User Study 1 based on their own experience and
knowledge.
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Two evaluation criteria were defined:
(a) how accurately the rule sets implement the access control
policy and
(b) how easily the rule sets can be understood and managed.
Afterward, the results from the experts are compared to rankings ob-
tained by using the provided metrics |SGi|. A high correlation is found
between the rankings obtained through using the metrics and the opin-
ions of the experts. These results validate Hypothesis H2 and Hypothe-
sis H3, therefore validating Hypothesis H1.
Section 6.1 is used as an example how to use the metrics and sets to
optimize an access control rule set and as a scenario for User Study 1
in Section 6.2. Limitations of the formalization and of the user studies
are discussed in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 discusses open questions and
shows possibilities for future refinements.
6.1. Example
In this section we provide a scenario to illustrate how the security and
usability metrics presented in the previous section can be used to mea-
sure, compare and optimize rule sets in order to construct usable access
control rule sets, i.e., rule sets that are easy to understand and manage
and that reflect the desired access control policy. The scenario presented
in this section is the same as the one used in User Study 1, presented in
the next section. The scenario is described by:
• a table of entities and their attributes,
• a table with the description of a file system and the desired policy,
• a graphical representation of the same file system and the desired
policy,
• two tables describing access control rule sets.
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Table 6.1.: Entity–Attribute–Relationship Table. The ‘x’ marks indicate that
a given attribute (column) is associated with a given entity (row),
e.g., entity 1 has attributes A3, A4 and A7.
Entity
Attributes
A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8
1 x x x
2 x x x
3 x x x
4 x x x
5 x x x x
6 x x x
7 x x x
8 x x x
In the scenario, each entity has an arbitrary number of attributes as-
signed to it. There are eight entities (1 to 8) and six attributes (A3 to A8)
and 12 Files (a.txt to l.txt). Table 6.1 illustrates the relationship between
entities and attributes.
The scenario describes a file system. It defines which files an entity
should or should not have access to. The file system mimics a MS-
Windows© file system with ‘C:’ as its root. The directories are assigned
the letters ‘a’, ‘b’, and ‘c’. All files have a ‘.txt’ extension. The file
system is presented in Table 6.2. Table 6.2 also includes the costSG1
associated with each file.
A graphical representation of the file system is shown in Figure 6.1.1.
It also depicts the costSG1 for files ‘d.txt’, ‘f.txt’ and ‘j.txt’. The costSG1
of each file (except ‘d.txt’, ‘f.txt’ and ‘j.txt’) is 10 points and the costSG2
of each file is 5.
Tables 6.3 and 6.5 present a rule set each. The rule sets are two dif-
ferent implementations of the access control policy represented in the
entity-attribute relationship shown in Table 6.1, applied to the file sys-
tem described in Table 6.2.
The compilation of the scores |SGi|, costSG1 and costSG2 (associated with
SG1 and SG2 respectively) in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 represent the results
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Table 6.2.: A description of the file system showing which files an entity
should have access to and the costSG1 , if an unauthorized access is
allowed, assigned to each file. The costSG2 , if an authorized access
is denied, assigned to each file, is 5 for each file.
costSG1 File Name Entities that should have access
10 C:\a\a.txt 1
10 C:\b\b.txt 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
10 C:\c\a\a\c.txt 3, 5, 6
50 C:\c\a\b\d.txt 3
10 C:\c\a\c\e.txt 3
80 C:\c\b\a\f.txt 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
10 C:\c\b\b\g.txt 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
10 C:\c\b\c\h.txt 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
10 C:\c\c\a\i.txt 3, 8
1 C:\c\c\b\j.txt 1, 2, 3, 8
10 C:\c\c\c\a\k.txt 3, 8
10 C:\c\c\c\b\a\a\l.txt 3, 8
obtained from each rule set and take into account the file system and
the desired entity-attribute relationship of the scenario.
It can be difficult to analyze the two rule sets and decide which better
fits the scenario without considering the scores |SGi|.
With the |SGi| scores, it is much easier to compare both rule sets, as the
scores provide a indication of the quality of each rule set with regard
to the defined goals for security and usability. The values of costSG1
and costSG2 are the most important values to compare when looking
Table 6.3.: Access Control Rule Set One
# Path Attributes Decision
1 c:\a\ A6 DENY
2 c:\ A6 ALLOW
3 c:\b\ A7 ALLOW
4 c:\c\a\ A4, A5 ALLOW
5 c:\c\b\ A7 ALLOW
6 c:\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
7 c:\c\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
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Table 6.4.: Usability scores computed using the metrics in Chapter 5of Access
Control Rule Set One
Goal |SGi| costSGi
G1 (Too much allowed) 10 320
G2 (Too little allowed) 3 15
G3 (Unnecessary rules) 1 -
G4 (Contradicting rules) 1 -
G5 (Elements in rule set) 22 -
Figure 6.1.1.: A graphical representation of the file system. It shows the files
an entity should have access to (below the file name) and the
non-default values costSG1(in red). The default value is 10.
at the accuracy of the rule sets, i.e., how accurate they are in making
correct access control decisions. |SG3|,|SG4|, and |SG5| are related to the
manageability of the access control rule set.
Regarding accuracy, rule set number two (Table 6.5) is superior to rule
set number one (Table 6.3), as it has better (lower) scores for |SG1|,
|SG2|, costSG1 and costSG2 , as shown in Tables 6.4 and 6.6. Rule Set One
has a better score than Rule Set Two only for|SG5|, having three less
elements. In all other categories, Rule Set Two is superior or equal to
Rule Set One.
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Table 6.5.: Access Control Rule Set Two
# Path Attributes Decision
1 c:\b\ A7 ALLOW
2 c:\c\ A6 ALLOW
3 c:\c\a\a\ A4, A5 ALLOW
4 c:\c\b\ A3 ALLOW
5 c:\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
6 c:\c\c\b\ A3, A4, A5 DENY
7 c:\c\c\b\ A3, A4 ALLOW
Table 6.6.: Usability scores computed using the metrics in Chapter 5of Access
Control Rule Set Two
Goal |SGi| costSGi
G1 0 0
G2 1 5
G3 0 -
G4 1 -
G5 25 -
When optimizing a rule set, the metrics add additional information. For
instance, regarding Rule Set One, the metric SG1 indicates 10 errors
with an associated costSG1 of 320. The costSG2 of denying authorized
accesses is 15 (in row G2). Inspecting the 10 elements in set SG1,
the following information can be extracted: {(E5,d.txt), (E5,e.txt),
(E6,d.txt), (E6,e.txt), (E6, f .txt), (E6,g.txt), (E6,h.txt), (E8, f .txt),
(E8,g.txt), (E8,h.txt)}. The cost function fSG1 shows that (E6, f .txt)
and (E8, f .txt) both have cost values of 80 and are the most critical
errors, i.e., the errors with the highest possible cost. These two errors
can be eliminated by changing the attribute A7 to A3 in rule #5. Then,
by recalculating the results we obtain: |SG1| = 4, |SG2| = 3, |SG3| = 1,
|SG4| = 1, |SG5| = 22 with a costSG1 of 120 and a costSG2 of 15. These
values indicate a significant improvement over the previous version of
the rule set.
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6.2. Validation of the Formal AC Rule Set
Definitions
We validated the sets and metrics and their usefulness in supporting the
users in optimizing of access control rule sets by testing three hypothe-
ses:
Hypothesis H1: The sets and metrics help users produce better rule sets.
Hypothesis H2: The usability scores computed using the metrics in
Chapter 5 correspond to rankings obtained from IT support profession-
als when evaluating the translation of policies into access control rule
sets (related to G1 and G2).
Hypothesis H3: The usability scores computed using the metrics in
Chapter 5 correspond to rankings obtained from IT support profession-
als when evaluating the understandability and manageability of access
control rule sets (related to G3, G4 and G5).
We tested these hypotheses with the help of two user studies. User
Study 1 was aimed at gathering data from both non-experts and IT sup-
port professionals regarding the creation of rule sets that match the sys-
tem owners’ intention, with and without the support of our proposed
sets and metrics. The outcome from User Study 1 was used as input to
User Study 2 where expert ratings regarding the usability of these rule
sets were compared to the values obtained through our metrics. The out-
put of the user studies was analyzed in Section 6.2.3 and the limitations
of our user studies are listed and discussed in Section 6.3.
6.2.1. User Study 1 - Optimizing Rule Sets
In User Study 1, participants were asked to complete a computer-
assisted task regarding the optimization of an access control rule set.
Two test conditions were used for completing the task: without the sets
and metrics (WOS) and with support of the sets and metrics (WS).
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Method Twelve participants took part in the study. The participants
were recruited by sending e-mails to mailing lists and asking for par-
ticipation in an IT research user study. Two thirds were non-experts
regarding access control configuration and management. The other four
participants were IT support professionals, who manage access control
mechanisms on a regular basis. One of the IT support professionals had
also participated in the pilot study. The age of the participants ranged
between twenty and fifty-five (µ = 34.5, σ = 8.1) and four participants
were female. Seven of the participants were graduate students, one had
a PhD degree, three held degrees from universities of applied sciences,
and one had no university degree. No financial incentive was offered to
the participants for taking part in the study.
A between subjects design was applied in this user study. The study
was designed as a laboratory experiment. The experiment was individ-
ual, i.e., one participant at a time. Participants had the task explained
by a supervisor (the task was described in writing and handed out at
the beginning of the experiment). The supervisor answered questions
regarding the task description, informed the participants about the max-
imum time allowed and enforced this time limit. The time allowed was
20 minutes (plus the time required to explain the task). Participants
were encouraged to vocalize their line of thought.
The task was to, given an existing access control rule set, minimize the
cost associated with it by changing, adding or deleting rules. The rule
set was given to the participants in the form of an MS Excel spread-
sheet to minimize possible bias do to the presentation of the task, as all
participants were familiar with this spreadsheet application.
There were two conditions used in the laboratory experiment: with-
out support of the sets and metrics (WOS) and with support of the sets
and metrics (WS). The IT support professionals were equally distributed
between the two conditions to avoid impact of their expertise on the re-
sults. The rest of the participants were randomly assigned to one of the
test conditions.
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In WOS, participants were asked to optimize the rule set without ad-
ditional support by any sets and metrics (apart from the spreadsheet
application). In WS, the spreadsheet application was programmed to
return all sets and metrics provided by our formalization, including the
total cost (= costSG1 + costSG2) associated with the rule set, which was
displayed when the participant clicked a button labeled UPDATE in the
spreadsheet application interface.
The participants were informed what rule sets are, how rules are ex-
pressed (in terms of ALLOW/DENY decisions), and how they are pro-
cessed (from top to bottom). In particular, the participants were in-
formed about the following: DENY rules have precedence over ALLOW
rules (this is done by moving all DENY rules to the beginning of the rule
set to mimic the behavior of a windows file-system), there is a default
implicit DENY ALL rule at the end of the rule set, and if a rule applies
to a directory then all its sub-directories and files inherit that same rule.
The task description contained: Table 6.1; Table 6.2 and its graphical
representation (Figure 6.1.1); and Table 6.3, which presented the initial
rule set that had to be modified by the participant to adhere to the desired
policy.
At the end of the experiment, participants handed in the access control
rule sets that they produced. Twelve rule sets were obtained. Partici-
pants in the condition WOS were asked, after handing in their rule sets,
to repeat the experiment with the support of the sets and metrics, i.e.,
following the WS test condition, and produced six new sets of rules.
The six additional rule sets were used to increase the size of the input to
User Study 2 and used only to test Hypothesis H2 and Hypothesis H3.
Naturally, the additional rule sets were not used to test Hypothesis H1
as they were affected by experiment order and learning effects. Order
and learning effects that affect the additional rule sets are not relevant
to the objectives of User Study 2.
Acquired Data The outcome of User Study 1 is three times six ac-
cess control rule sets (six from test condition WOS, six from test condi-
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Table 6.7.: Spearman’s rank correlation test between the automatically pro-
duced rankings and the rankings obtained in User Study 2. Pro-
posal refers to the automatically produced ranking and Result 1
to Result 4 to the results obtained from IT support professionals.
N = 18 for all cases. A correlation coefficient of 1.000 would rep-
resent perfect correlation to the proposal. A correlation coefficient
of 0.000 would represent no correlation at all.
Spearman’s rho Correlation Coefficients
Proposal Result 1 Result 2 Result 3 Result 4
Hypothesis 2 1.000 .908** .967** .971** .955**
Hypothesis 3 1.000 .922** .820** .874** .777**
tion WS, and the six additional ones). These rule sets were used as input
for User Study 2.
6.2.2. User Study 2 - Approach Versus Experts
In User Study 2, the participants were IT support professionals. They
were asked to evaluate and rank the rule sets that were obtained from
User Study 1 based on their own experience and knowledge.
Two evaluation criteria were defined:
(a) how accurately the rule sets implement the access control
policy and
(b) how easily the rule sets can be understood and managed.
Methodology The 18 rule sets generated in User Study 1 were tested
in 8 sub-experiments, that were performed with N = 18 each. Four IT
support professionals took part in the evaluation according to criterion
(a) and four took part in the evaluation according to criterion (b). Each
expert processed all 18 rule sets. The IT support professionals were
recruited from business and public sectors (universities). One of the
participants had taken part in the pilot study and User Study 1. Two of
the IT support professionals had taken part in the pilot study but not in
User Study 1. The IT support professionals were not informed about
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the metrics or goals of the user study. All of them managed access
control mechanisms on a regular basis and had worked several years
in positions related to IT support. Again, no financial incentive was
offered to the participants1.
The collection of access control rule sets was sent to the IT support
professionals by electronic mail. The ordering of the rule sets was ran-
domized before being sent to the participants. The participants were
asked to order the rule sets regarding criteria (a) and (b) and provide a
short description of their approach for evaluating the rule sets. No time
limit was set to complete the ranking.
Acquired Data The results of User Study 2 are two rankings from
each expert. One reflects the opinion of the IT support professionals re-
garding how accurately the rule sets implement the access control policy
and the other reflects how easily, in their opinion, the rule sets can be
understood and managed. The participants claimed to have taken up to
seven hours to complete the task and one stated that the analysis of some
rule sets took close to one hour to analyze. The IT support professionals
reported different approaches and methods used in their rankings. The
main aspects reported when evaluating manageability of rule set were
the following: the time needed to read and understand it, the number
of elements in it, and the number of DENY rules. The translation of
the defined policy into a rule set was evaluated according to the number
of security gaps and wrongly denied accesses. Next, each outcome of
the sub-experiments of User Study 2 was tested for correlation with the
outcome obtained using our sets and metrics.
6.2.3. Results and Evaluation
In this section we describe how we validated our three hypotheses.
Hypotheses H2 and H3 were validated by the strong correlation be-
tween the ranking produced by IT support professionals and the rank-
1We again promised to inform them first-hand about our findings and conclusions.
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Table 6.8.: Independent Samples t-test
Levene’s Test for Equality t-test for Equality of Means
of Variances
(2
-t
ai
le
d)
M
ea
n Std. 95% Confidence
Equal
F Sig.
Error Interval of the Diff.
variances t df Sig. Diff. Diff. Lower Upper
assumed 3.005 .114 3.692 10 .004 153 41.446 60.653 245.347
not assumed 3.692 7.621 .007 153 41.446 56.592 249.408
ing obtained by using our usability scores computed using the metrics
in Chapter 5. After validating Hypothesis H2, we validated Hypothesis
H1.
To validate Hypothesis H2 and Hypothesis H3, we compared the rank-
ings produced by the IT support professionals in User Study 2 and the
rankings generated using our usability scores computed using the met-
rics in Chapter 5. For testing Hypothesis H2, we compared the list of the
four rankings produced using criterion (a) and the rankings generated
using the total cost metric (costSG1 +costSG2). Hypothesis H3 was tested
by comparing the list of the four rankings produced using criterion (b)
and the rankings generated using SG3, SG4 and SG5.
Spearman rank correlation coefficients were computed to assess the re-
lationship between the rankings. Overall, there was a significant pos-
itive correlation between the automatically produced rankings and the
rankings obtained from User Study 2, as shown in Table 6.7. The results
from these tests validate both Hypothesis H2 and Hypothesis H3.
The correlation was higher for Hypothesis H2 than for Hypothesis H3.
This was expected because there is a common methodology to evaluate
how accurately a rule set implements an access control policy by an-
alyzing the results for security gaps and non-granted legitimate access
rights. The IT support professionals used similar methodologies to rank
the rule sets according to criterion (a). Interestingly, all IT support pro-
fessionals made small mistakes by overlooking some gaps. However,
when ranking the rule sets according to their manageability, the IT sup-
port professionals used a wider variety of approaches, such as counting
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Figure 6.2.1.: Box plot showing the results of User Study 1. They are pre-
sented with 0.95 confidence interval. The WS group (with
support of our metrics and sets) performed significantly bet-
ter (lower values) regarding the cost score than the WOS group
(without support of our metrics and sets).
the number of DENY rules, the time spent to understand the rule set, or
deciding intuitively.
User Study 2 aimed to evaluate whether the values |SG3|, |SG4| and |SG5|
can be used to provide results that are similar to results obtained from IT
support professionals. The results from User Study 2 showed a strong
correlation between the results obtained from the IT support profes-
sionals and the results that were automatically generated by software
that implements our proposed formalization. This result validated the
expressiveness of |SG3|, |SG4| and |SG5|.
After validating Hypothesis H2, we were able to test Hypothesis H1 by
calculating the total cost metric of each access control rule set produced
in the User Study 1 and comparing the results from the WOS and WS
groups.
The Box plot in Figure 6.2.1 summarizes the results obtained from
User Study 1. The mean total cost for condition WOS (no support)
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was significantly higher (µ = 187.7, σ = 36.7) than the total cost for
condition WS (with support) (µ = 34.7, σ = 19.5). This difference in
the results is also shown in Table 6.8, which compares the results for
the two conditions using independent samples t-test for the test condi-
tions WOS (µ = 187.7, σ = 36.7) and WS (µ = 34.7, σ = 19.5) for
t(3.692) = 7.621 and p = 0.007.
The participants in WS performed significantly better than the partici-
pants in WOS. The analysis of the results obtained from User Study 1
validated Hypothesis H1 by showing that our sets and metrics help users
to produce significantly better rule sets.
6.3. Remarks
A real case regarding the management of an access control rule set can
easily involve tens of thousands of objects and as many entities. Still,
we deliberately designed User Study 1 with few objects (12) and entities
(8). Our decision to limit the number of objects and entities was based
on two considerations. First, a more complex scenario would be more
difficult for participants to understand given the conditions and practical
limitations of the study. Second, User Study 1 is close to a worst case
scenario with respect to the performance of our approach as a more
complex scenario would also increase the space for misconfiguration
and errors. As our metrics are designed to allow identification of such
cases, it is expected to produce significantly better results in a more
complex and non-controlled environment.
The sample size of User Study 1 (twelve participants) is not large, but
enough to obtain significant results from the statistical tests on the col-
lected data. In User Study 2, four IT support professionals ranked the
18 rule sets produced in User Study 1. Increasing the number of par-
ticipants in User Study 1 would result in a large sample of rule sets
and it would also increase the number of rule sets each IT professional
would need to rank. A practical limitation of our study is that all the
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participants were volunteers, and the amount of effort required from the
experts was considerable. The four IT professionals in User Study 2
produced similar rankings, which suggests that four was sufficient for
our evaluation. The IT professional volunteers were very positive about
our studies and, following User Study 1, two of them independently
asked the study supervisor about the possibility of integrating our tools
into their workflow, as they strongly believed that the tools would facil-
itate their work.
A limitation of User Study 2 is that it cannot individually validate the
metrics |SG3|, |SG4| and |SG5|, but rather only the composition of all
factors together. Hence, we were not able to evaluate the impact of
each individual metric when testing rule sets for their manageability. It
would be interesting to analyze the individual impact of each metric to
obtain even better results.
6.4. Discussion
In this section we discuss our findings, open challenges towards intro-
ducing new factors in our metrics and opportunities for future work.
The six goals for building usable access control rule sets presented in
our work were derived from the pilot study. The goals formalize the
metrics used by experts to evaluate rule sets. This set of goals is not
comprehensive and is a subset of goals for building usable access con-
trol rule sets. Other metrics could be included in the set if they are found
relevant in future studies. For instance, the design of the user interface
was never mentioned during the interviews of the pilot study, but it may
be an important aspect for most users. Another factor that is not re-
flected by our metrics is the indirect interdependency of rules, which
may impact the usability of rule sets. Extending the set of metrics could
lead to better rule sets, but determining their importance would require
further testing and evaluation.
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A challenging aspect of our building blocks presented in Section 9 is
the formalization of the owners’ intention, fintended. Obtaining the own-
ers’ intention is out of the scope of this dissertation but it is a key aspect
to be considered in future work. Solutions would possibly involve di-
rect interaction with the owner using tools, such as a reactive access
control mechanism [Mazurek et al., 2011], psychological testing, ques-
tionnaires or observation of the owners’ behavior in using and sharing
data.
Another important aspect to be carefully analyzed is the use of cost
functions. Assignment of costs is highly subjective and dependent on
the nature of data. Costs are relevant for defining levels of impor-
tance for different objects (i.e., different objects with different costs)
and goals (i.e., different costs for too much allowed access and too little
allowed access). Nevertheless, the metrics presented in this dissertation
are independent of cost assignment. An interesting extension of this
work would be to introduce cost functions for the sets SG3, SG4, SG5 and
SG6. The additional cost functions would be an important step towards
building a single metric instead of multiple metrics to rate a rule set.
Optimizing a criterion could affect other criteria, therefore it is im-
portant to evaluate dependencies between criteria in future work. For
instance, eliminating contradictions (G4) can sometimes lead to a more
complex rule set (G5) as shown in the following example:
RULE 1: A lice is denied access to file.
RULE 2: Everyone is allowed access to file.
Above we have a short rule set with one contradiction. A non-
contradicting rule set that describes the same scenario could be im-
plemented as following:
RULE 1: Bob is allowed access to file.
RULE 2: Chris is allowed access to file.
RULE 3: Dave is allowed access to file.
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. . .
RULE 23: Xena is allowed access to file.
RULE 24: Yuri is allowed access to file.
RULE 25: Zara is allowed access to file.
This rule set has more elements and no contradictions. Cost func-
tions of the sets SG3 to SG6 would show the tradeoffs between multiple
criteria.
6.5. Summary
In this chapter two user studies are described. The results validated the
following three hypothesis.
Hypothesis H1: The sets and metrics help users produce better rule sets.
Hypothesis H2: The usability scores computed using the metrics in
Chapter 5 correspond to rankings obtained from IT support profession-
als when evaluating the translation of policies into access control rule
sets (related to G1 and G2).
Hypothesis H3: The usability scores computed using the metrics in
Chapter 5 correspond to rankings obtained from IT support profession-
als when evaluating the understandability and manageability of access
control rule sets (related to G3, G4 and G5).
The next chapter gives an outlook to future research and a conclusion
to this dissertation.
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7. Outlook and Conclusion
The generation of accurate and optimized access control rule sets is a
complex task. It can be effectively approached by dividing the task into
smaller sub-problems. The identified sub-problems are:
1. Data Accumulation
2. Rule Extraction and Optimization
3. Rule Set Inspection
To tackle these sub-problems, the results of this dissertation have to be
integrated with research from the fields of psychology, machine learn-
ing, and human-computer interface to obtain a holistic approach.
7.1. Data Accumulation / Getting
Owners’ Intention
The first and maybe most important step is to acquire an initial access
control policy. The process of getting initial access control informa-
tion is often about extracting owners’ intention into a machine readable
form. This process can be problematic since users are not always capa-
ble of precisely and unambiguously defining their wishes.
Two approaches are conceivable. First, the classical approach, whereby
users e.g., manually implement access control rights in an ABAC mech-
anism. This process makes a potentially large amount of errors possible.
With the help of intuitively usable human-computer interfaces, ques-
tionnaires, and the metrics provided in this dissertation (see Chapter 5
and Chapter 6), the process can be made much easier for users.
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Second, observations of behavior on a running system can be stored and
interpreted as an initial access control policy. This is adequate as long as
the observed entities behave correctly. To guarantee that no malicious
behavior is integrated in the access policy, system owners have to check
the gathered information afterward. This information may help owners
in generating appropriate access rules.
7.2. Rule Extraction and Optimization
After the Data Accumulation step the access control information or ini-
tial rule set may be unrefined. Especially casual users may encounter
difficulties. Additional tools like the metrics provided in Chapter 5 can
help users to manually optimize access control rule sets as seen in Chap-
ter 6.
The provided metrics of Chapter 5 also have the power to be used as
optimization criteria for automated rule generation and optimization.
The goal of a rule optimization algorithm is to minimize the sets SGi
described in Section 5.4. The sets can be assigned to three different
classes:
• Functional Sets (SG1 & SG2)
• Configuration Sets (SG3 & SG4 & SG5)
• Future Set (SG6)
It is difficult to optimize the Functional Sets and the Future Set directly
since external information is needed:
To minimize the Functional Sets directly, the intention of the owners
needs to be acquired to eliminate deviance to the actual system behavior
as described in Section 7.1.
For the direct optimization of the Future Set SG6, knowledge about the
future state of the system would be required. This information is gen-
erally only available in part, if at all. Fortunately, SG6 improves when
minimizing the configuration sets (see Section 5.4). A more readable
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and easier to configure access control rule set also helps users find and
correct errors regarding SG1 & SG2. So by directly minimizing the Con-
figuration Sets, indirect benefits for all the other sets are obtained.
However, as already mentioned, user preferences make full automation
difficult. The next section gives a possible approach to minimize the
required user interaction even further.
7.3. Rule Set Inspection
The majority of users nowadays are unable to properly configure se-
curity mechanisms, mostly because the mechanisms are not usable for
them, as demonstrated in related work (see Section 2.6). To attain the
goal of having usable security mechanisms, the best solution is to min-
imize the amount of user interactions and simplify configuration tasks.
Automation is an appropriate solution for minimizing the amount of
user interaction.
Fully automated access control policy generation is currently not pos-
sible and may never be because individual preferences must be taken
into account (see Section 2.3), therefore generation still requires at least
some user interaction. To address this problem, we propose a mecha-
nism that helps users inspect rule sets and helps them reflect their indi-
vidual preferences. We call this mechanism Interactive Rule Learning
for Access Control. Interactive Rule Learning is designed to generate
concise rule sets for Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC).
7.4. Future Vision: Interactive Rule
Learning
One important question to answer is: what is private and confidential
data? There is no universal answer for this question because it depends
on the person being asked. For that reason, it is important that the user’s
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preferences are taken into account in the decision of what is made pub-
lic and what is kept secret. However, the users can not be expected to
be satisfied with having to manually define all the rules for each de-
vice [Cranor and Garfinkel, 2005]. There is a need for some kind of
automation that lets every user only select their preferences once or a
small number of times, and subsequently have these preferences used
automatically. In addition, a set of default rules suitable for most use
cases enhances the usability of the security mechanism.
That way only slight user intervention is required to generate and main-
tain access rules. However, there still may remain a lot of interaction
requests if the rules are too fine-grained or if the rules need to change
often. Appropriate rules should not only cover the current context, but
also future situations such as “any employee may access the file server”.
When new employees are hired, they should immediately have the right
to access the file server. An overly specific rule that does not generalize
would be: “Mr. Jonson is allowed to access the printer”. Rules of this
kind would be necessary for each employee, leading to a barely man-
ageable set of rules. Excessively general rules are problematic, too, be-
cause they may allow unauthorized entities to perform restricted tasks.
If e.g., a rule says “everyone is allowed to do anything”, the AC itself is
pointless.
7.4.1. Example
In our example, we consider a family of four. Alice (a), Bob (b), and
their children Charlie (c), a 17-year old, and Denise (d), an 8-year old.
The set with elements {a,b,c,d} is the family, and the subset with el-
ements {a,b} are the parents. In the family’s kitchen there are 3 new
smart products: a smart coffee machine (x), a smart blender (y), and a
smart oven (z).
We assume that newly bought devices come with a default set of access
rules, which are defined by the smart product manufacturers. Since
the manufactures cannot predict in which way the smart products are
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going to be used, the factory settings for access control rules are fairly
general. They follow the usage rules of similar non-smart products, i.e.,
everyone that physically interacts with a device is allowed to use it up
to its full functionality. For instance, everyone locally interacting with
a coffee machine is allowed to brew coffee.
Full control of a smart product is given to the first user who activates
it. A smart product might be remotely controlled by its users (through
smart devices) after it has been integrated into the home environment.
a wants to configure and generates access rules for the 3 newly bought
smart products (x, y, z), so that her family can best benefit from them.
Three classes of access rights are preset in smart devices (those classes
can later be reconfigured or changed):
1. Full access: the right to locally or remotely access a smart prod-
uct and to manage its access rights.
2. Remote and local access: the right to locally and remotely access
a smart product.
3. Local access: the right to locally access the smart products.
a wants to grant b with full control over all the smart products. c shall
get access to the full functionality (locally and remotely), but shall not
have administrative rights over the smart products. d shall not have any
access to the devices, even by local interaction. Since the family often
has guests, a wants them to be able to locally interact with the smart
products, just as in a non-smart kitchen. The initial manually generated
rule set has some errors (see Table 7.1):
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Table 7.1.: Interactive Rule Learning Rule Set 1
1: If (owner) → full access
2: If (any) → local access
3: If (a) → full access
4: If (b) → full access
5: If (c) → remote and local access
6: If (d) → no access to x
7: If (d) → no access to y
8: If (a) → no access to z
9: If (guest) → local access
• The first two rules are leftovers from the preloaded default rule
set. The fact that a ignored them leads to two implications regard-
ing requirements G3 (Make sure that a rule is not fully covered
by another rule of the same rule set) and G4 (Two rules within
the same rule set must not conflict). Rule 2 is a superset of rule
9, and it also contradicts rules 6, 7, and 8. Moreover, since some
rules are redundant, their number is surely not minimal, which
contradicts G5.
• Rule 9 is misconfigured as it does not reflect a’s expectation.
Instead of denying d, she denied herself access to z. It contra-
dicts requirements G2 (Allow everything the owner wants to be
allowed) and G4 (Two rules within the same rule set must not
conflict).
• The rules were generated by taking specific family members into
account, instead of more general attributes, such as age. The use
of attributes for generating small and understandable rule sets
is recommended and is one of the reasons why ABAC is better
suited for smart products, as mentioned in Section 2.4. There-
fore, there is a contradiction with G5 (Minimize the number of
rule set elements).
The smart products analyze the manually generated rule set, consider-
ing the usability and security constraints presented in Chapter 4, and
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produce new rule sets that are free of conflicts. In our example, the
smart products present to the user a two automatically generated rule
set alternatives, as seen in Table 7.2 and Table 7.3.
Table 7.2.: Interactive Rule Learning Rule Set 2
1: If (age > 40) → full access
2: If (family & age > 16) → remote and local access
3: If (age > 9) → local access
Table 7.3.: Interactive Rule Learning Rule Set 3
1: If (parents) → full access
2: If (family & age > 16) → remote and local access
3: If (age > 16) → local access
It is up to a to decide which rule set suits her needs best. Both rule sets
look much better and more concise than the manually generated rule
set. However, the first rule of Rule Set 2 is way too general (a violation
of requirement G1), since it gives full access rights for everyone above
40, including potential guests. The last rule of Rule Set 2 is also not
to her liking, since a would not trust a 9-year old to operate kitchen
appliances (but she would trust a 12-year old). Thus, a picks Rule Set
3, but manually changes rules 2 and 3 to better fit her expectations. The
modified rule set, Rule Set 4, can be seen in Table 7.4.
Table 7.4.: Interactive Rule Learning Rule Set 4
1: If (parents) → full access
2: If (family & age > 12) → remote and local access
3: If (age > 12) → local access
A comparison between the manually generated Rule Set 1 and the in-
teractive generated Rule Set 4 demonstrates a great improvement of
the latter regarding the usability and security requirements presented
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in Chapter 4. Rule Set 4 addresses the security requirements G1 and
G2 since the rules are specific and meaningful. Usability requirements
G3, G4, G5, and G6 are also fulfilled since there are no redundant rules,
and the rules are consistent, understandable, meaningful, manageable
and express the owner’s security expectations with a minimal amount
of rules.
7.5. Conclusion
In this dissertation security and usability metrics are introduced that
quantify how usable access control rule sets are (see definition of usable
access control rule sets in Section 1).
A possible integration of usable access control into smart products is
shown. Based on analysis of the different AC mechanisms, we pro-
pose the combination of a blacklist, an attribute based access control
(ABAC) approach, and a cooperative intrusion detection system (IDS)
further combined with Interactive Rule Learning in the future to satisfy
current and future needs for smart products usability. A design descrip-
tion based on FMC diagrams showed the integration of the proposed
security solution into the SmartProducts framework. The Access Han-
dler and Security Administration design components directly correlate
to the aforementioned principles of ABAC and Interactive Rule Learn-
ing. Use cases were provided for both components to demonstrate the
dynamic structure of the smart products security design.
After performing an initial analysis of security objectives, gaps regard-
ing the usability of access control rule set configuration were identified.
Informal requirements for usable access control rule sets were refined
out of a pilot study and related work.
These informal requirements were then formalized. A minimal set of
basic formal building blocks was obtained as a set of six formal defi-
nitions for security and usability properties of access control rule sets.
They provide tangible and simple sets, metrics, and optimization crite-
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ria that reflect the characteristics and the errors in access control rule
sets. The provided metrics were validated by user studies that resulted
in statistically significant evidence supporting the hypotheses:
Hypothesis H1: The sets and metrics help users produce better rule sets.
Hypothesis H2: The usability scores computed using the metrics in
Chapter 5 correspond to rankings obtained from IT support profession-
als when evaluating the translation of policies into access control rule
sets (related to G1 and G2).
Hypothesis H3: The usability scores computed using the metrics in
Chapter 5 correspond to rankings obtained from IT support profession-
als when evaluating the understandability and manageability of access
control rule sets (related to G3, G4 and G5).
In conclusion, our approach offers a uniform and scientific method for
comparing different rule sets. Moreover, our metrics can be used as
optimization criteria to generate usable access control rule sets and to
improve their manageability. Furthermore, a formalization is the first
step towards the implementation of tools for automatically measuring
and comparing different rule sets.
Future and ongoing work aims to demonstrate that the implementation
of the results presented in this dissertation can be used to automatically
improve rule sets. The objective of such work is to design tools that can
be integrated into the everyday working environment to actively help
users produce usable access control rule sets and to make Interactive
Rule Learning possible.
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A. Appendix
A.1. User Study Rule Sets
In this section the rule sets generated in User Study 1 are shown. The
rule sets are ordered by the total cost of each rule set. The best rule set
(which has the lowest cost) is at the top, the worst rule set is at the end.
These are the rule sets that were sent in random order to the experts for
User Study 2.
Table A.1.: User Study - Rule Set 1
# Path Attributes Decision
1 C:\a\ A5 DENY
2 C: A6 ALLOW
3 C:\b\ A7 ALLOW
4 C:\c\a\a\ A4 A5 ALLOW
5 C:\c\b\ A3 ALLOW
6 C:\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
7 C:\c\c\b\ A3 A4 ALLOW
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Table A.2.: User Study - Rule Set 2
# Path Attributes Decision
1 C:\a\ A5 DENY
2 C: A6 ALLOW
3 C:\b\ A7 ALLOW
4 C:\c\a\b\ A6 A5 A7 ALLOW
5 C:\c\b\ A7 A3 ALLOW
6 C:\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
7 C:\c\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
8 C:\c\c\b\ A3 A4 ALLOW
9 C:\c\a\a\ A4 A5 A7 ALLOW
Table A.3.: User Study - Rule Set 3
# Path Attributes Decision
1 C:\a\ A6 DENY
2 C: A6 ALLOW
3 C:\b\ A7 ALLOW
4 C:\c\a\ A6 ALLOW
5 C:\c\b\ A3 ALLOW
6 C:\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
7 C:\c\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
8 C:\c\b\ A6 ALLOW
9 C:\c\c\b\ A3 A4 ALLOW
10 C:\c\a\a\ A4 A5 ALLOW
Table A.4.: User Study - Rule Set 4
# Path Attributes Decision
1 C:\a\ A6 DENY
2 C: A6 ALLOW
3 C:\b\ A7 ALLOW
4 C:\c\a\a\ A4 A5 ALLOW
5 C:\c\b\ A3 ALLOW
6 C:\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
7 C:\c\c\b\ A4 A3 ALLOW
8 C:\c\b\ A6 ALLOW
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Table A.5.: User Study - Rule Set 5
# Path Attributes Decision
1 C:\a\ A6 DENY
2 C: A6 ALLOW
3 C:\b\ A7 ALLOW
4 C:\c\a\a\ A4 A5 ALLOW
5 C:\c\b\ A3 ALLOW
6 C:\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
7 C:\c\c\b\ A4 A3 ALLOW
8 C:\c\b\ A6 ALLOW
Table A.6.: User Study - Rule Set 6
# Path Attributes Decision
1 C:\a\ A7 ALLOW
2 C:\a\ A5 DENY
3 C:\b\ A7 ALLOW
4 C:\c\a\ A4 A5 ALLOW
5 C:\c\a\a\ A6 ALLOW
6 C:\c\a\b\ A6 ALLOW
7 C:\c\a\c\ A6 ALLOW
8 C:\c\b\ A3 ALLOW
9 C:\c\b\a\ A6 ALLOW
10 C:\c\b\b\ A6 ALLOW
11 C:\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
12 C:\c\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
13 C:\c\a\b\ A4 DENY
14 C:\c\a\c\ A4 DENY
15 C:\c\b\ A6 ALLOW
16 C:\c\c\ A6 ALLOW
17 C:\c\c\b\ A3 A4 ALLOW
18 C:\c\c\b\ A3 A4 A5 DENY
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Table A.7.: User Study - Rule Set 7
# Path Attributes Decision
1 C:\a\ A6 DENY
2 C: A6 ALLOW
3 C:\b\ A7 ALLOW
4 C:\c\a\a\ A4 A5 ALLOW
5 C:\c\b\ A3 ALLOW
6 C:\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
7 C:\c\b A5 A6 ALLOW
8 C:\c\a\b\ A4 A5 DENY
9 C:\c\b\a\ A8 DENY
10 C:\c\b\a\ A4 A5 DENY
11 C:\c\c\b\ A3 A4 ALLOW
Table A.8.: User Study - Rule Set 8
# Path Attributes Decision
1 C:\a\ A6 DENY
2 C: A6 ALLOW
3 C:\b\ A7 ALLOW
4 C:\c\a\ A4 A5 ALLOW
5 C:\c\b\ A7 ALLOW
6 C:\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
7 C:\c\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
8 C:\c\b\a\ A8 DENY
9 C:\c\b\a\ A4 A5 DENY
10 C:\c\a\b\ A4 A5 DENY
11 C:\c\a\c\ A4 A5 DENY
12 C:\c\b\b\ A8 DENY
13 C:\c\b\b\ A4 A5 DENY
14 C:\c\b\c\ A8 DENY
15 C:\c\b\c\ A4 A5 DENY
16 C:\c\c\b\ A3 A4 ALLOW
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Table A.9.: User Study - Rule Set 9
# Path Attributes Decision
1 C:\a\ A6 DENY
2 C: A6 ALLOW
3 C:\b\ A7 ALLOW
4 C:\c\a\ A4 A5 ALLOW
5 C:\c\b\ A7 ALLOW
6 C:\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
7 C:\c\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
8 C:\c\a\b\ A4 A5 DENY
9 C:\c\b\ A8 DENY
10 C:\c\b\b\ A8 DENY
11 C:\c\b\c\ A8 DENY
12 C:\c\a\c\ A4 A5 DENY
13 C:\c\b\c\ A4 A5 DENY
14 C:\c\c\b\ A7 ALLOW
15 C:\c\b\a\ A3 A4 A5 ALLOW
16 C:\c\b\a\ A4 A5 DENY
17 C:\c\b\b\ A4 A5 DENY
18 C:\c\b\c\ A3 ALLOW
19 C:\c\b\c\ A6 ALLOW
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Table A.10.: User Study - Rule Set 10
# Path Attributes Decision
1 C:\a\ A3 A4 A7 ALLOW
2 C:\b\ A1 ALLOW
3 C:\c\a\ A4 A5 ALLOW
4 C:\c\b\ A7 ALLOW
5 C:\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
6 C:\c\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
7 C:\b\ A2 ALLOW
8 C:\b\ A3 ALLOW
9 C:\b\ A4 ALLOW
10 C:\b\ A5 ALLOW
11 C:\b\ A6 ALLOW
12 C:\b\ A7 ALLOW
13 C:\b\ A8 ALLOW
14 C:\c\c\b\ A3 A4 A7 ALLOW
15 C:\c\b\a\ A5 A7 A8 DENY
16 C:\c\b\a\ A4 A5 A7 DENY
17 C:\c\a\b\ A3 A4 A5 A7 DENY
18 C:\c\a\b\ A4 A5 A7 DENY
19 C: A6 ALLOW
20 C:\a\ A5 A5 A7 DENY
21 C:\c\a\c\ A3 A4 A5 A7 DENY
22 C:\c\a\c\ A4 A5 A7 DENY
23 C:\c\b\b\ A4 A5 A7 DENY
24 C:\c\b\b\ A5 A7 A8 DENY
25 C:\c\b\c\ A5 A7 A8 DENY
26 C:\c\b\c\ A4 A5 A7 DENY
27 C:\c\b\a\ A3 A4 A5 A7 ALLOW
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Table A.11.: User Study - Rule Set 11
# Path Attributes Decision
1 C:\a\ A3 A4 ALLOW
2 C:\a\ A5 DENY
3 C:\b\ A7 ALLOW
4 C:\c\ A6 ALLOW
5 C:\c\a\a\ A4 A5 ALLOW
6 C:\c\b\ A7 ALLOW
7 C:\c\b\ A8 DENY
8 C:\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
9 C:\c\c\b\ A3 A4 ALLOW
Table A.12.: User Study - Rule Set 12
# Path Attributes Decision
1 C:\a\ A5 DENY
2 C: A6 ALLOW
3 C:\b\ A7 ALLOW
4 C:\c\a\ A4 A5 ALLOW
5 C:\c\b\ A3 ALLOW
6 C:\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
7 C:\c\c\b\ A5 DENY
8 C:\c\c\b\ A3 A4 ALLOW
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Table A.13.: User Study - Rule Set 13
# Path Attributes Decision
1 C:\a\ A7 DENY
2 C:\c\a\a\ A4 A5 A7 ALLOW
3 C:\b\ A7 ALLOW
4 C:\a\b\ A6 ALLOW
5 C:\a\c\ A6 ALLOW
6 C:\c\b\a\ A7 DENY
7 C:\c\b\b\ A7 ALLOW
8 C:\c\b\c\ A7 ALLOW
9 C:\c\c\a\ A8 ALLOW
10 C:\c\c\b\ A3 A4 A7 ALLOW
11 C:\c\ A6 ALLOW
12 C:\b\ A6 ALLOW
13 C:\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
14 C:\c\b\ A8 DENY
15 C:\c\b\ A3 ALLOW
16 C:\c\b\ A6 ALLOW
Table A.14.: User Study - Rule Set 14
# Path Attributes Decision
1 C:\a\ A6 DENY
2 C: A6 ALLOW
3 C:\b\ A7 ALLOW
4 C:\c\a\ A4 A5 ALLOW
5 C:\c\b\ A3 ALLOW
6 C:\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
7 C:\c\c\ A8 A7 ALLOW
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Table A.15.: User Study - Rule Set 15
# Path Attributes Decision
1 C:\a\ A6 DENY
2 C: A6 ALLOW
3 C:\b\ A7 ALLOW
4 C:\c\a\ A4 A5 DENY
5 C:\c\b\ A7 ALLOW
6 C:\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
7 C:\c\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
8 C:\c\b\a\ A8 DENY
Table A.16.: User Study - Rule Set 16
# Path Attributes Decision
1 C:\a\ A6 DENY
2 C: A6 ALLOW
3 C:\b\ A7 ALLOW
4 C:\c\a\a\ A4 A5 ALLOW
5 C:\c\a\a\ A5 A6 A7 ALLOW
6 C:\c\b\ A7 ALLOW
7 C:\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
8 C:\c\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
Table A.17.: User Study - Rule Set 17
# Path Attributes Decision
1 C:\a\ A6 DENY
2 C: A6 ALLOW
3 C:\b\ A7 ALLOW
4 C:\c\a\ A4 A5 ALLOW
5 C:\c\b\ A3 ALLOW
6 C:\c\b\ A6 ALLOW
7 C:\c\b\ A8 ALLOW
8 C:\c\c\b\ A3 A4 ALLOW
9 C:\c\c\b\ A6 ALLOW
10 C:\c\c\b\ A8 ALLOW
11 C:\c\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
12 C:\c\c\a\ A8 ALLOW
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Table A.18.: User Study - Rule Set 18
# Path Attributes Decision
1 C:\a\ A6 DENY
2 C: A6 ALLOW
3 C:\b\ A7 ALLOW
4 C:\c\a\ A4 A5 ALLOW
5 C:\c\b\ A7 ALLOW
6 C:\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
7 C:\c\c\c\ A8 ALLOW
8 C:\c\b A8 DENY
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